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Grutter v. Bollinger is familiar to American lawyers,
academics, and law students as the Supreme Court decision allowing
the consideration of race in law school admissions.1 Grutter's
procedural history is nearly as noteworthy as its substantive holding.
The University of Michigan Law School, after losing in federal district
court, 2 appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.3
Three Democratic appointees were assigned to the panel: Judges
Karen Nelson Moore and Martha Craig Daughtrey, who had heard an
earlier interlocutory appeal, and Chief Judge Boyce Martin, who
replaced the designated district judge from the earlier panel.4 The
white applicant reqiiested that the entire court, rather than a panel,
hear the case. 5 The Sixth Circuit granted the en banc petition.6 A
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School's method for
considering race and ethnicity in its admissions policy, but striking down, in the related lawsuit,
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), the specific affirmative action methodology used by the
undergraduate admissions program).
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding, in an opinion
by Judge Bernard A. Friedman, that the University of Michigan Law School's consideration of
race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act).
3. The appeal was filed on April 2, 2001. Id., appeal docketed, No. 01-1447 (6th Cir. Apr. 2,
2001) [hereinafter Grutter Docket Sheet]. The Grutter Docket Sheet is publicly available. It does
not reflect, however, certain internal activities of the court, such as circulation of petitions for
votes, specific votes on those petitions, or the identity of judges other than the judge (or judges)
who sign an order. The Sixth Circuit maintains a private docket that includes such additional
information. This private docket sheet usually is not available to the public, but its content was
described in a concurring opinion in the case. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752, 754
(6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Moore, J., concurring) (describing the "private docket" in the case).
4. While the Grutter Docket Sheet does not reflect the composition of the new panel, it
does disclose decisions by the panel regarding minor matters that arose between the law school's
filing of the notice of appeal and oral argument. See, e.g., Grutter Docket Sheet, supra note 3,
April 5, 2001 entry (noting the panel decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 247 F.3d 631, 633 (6th Cir.
2001), a ruling by Martin, Daughtrey, and Moore on April 5, 2001, which granted the law
school's request for a stay, pending appeal, of the district court's order enjoining the
consideration of race in admissions).
5. See Grutter Docket Sheet, supra note 3, May 14, 2001 entry (showing petition for en
banc hearing prior to submission of briefs).
6. Gratz v. Bollinger, 277 F.3d 803, 803 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (granting en banc hearing
by order dated October 19, 2001).
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closely divided en banc court reversed the district court in an opinion
authored by Martin.
7
Normally, that is all we would know about the process by
which the Sixth Circuit decided the case. But something highly
unusual happened. Judge Danny Boggs included with his dissenting
opinion a five-page procedural appendix detailing intracourt
machinations and accusing the Chief Judge of manipulating
procedures to affect the outcome.8 Boggs alleged that Martin violated
circuit rules by assigning himself, rather than a randomly selected
judge, to the three-judge panel.9 This assertion alone does not seem
very significant-the case was decided, after all, by the en banc court.
Boggs's more pointed accusation was that Martin engineered the en
banc voting process to ensure a court balanced in favor of the law
school. When the white student petitioned for an en banc hearing,
eleven active judges sat on the Sixth Circuit; two of those judges had
expressed their intent to take senior status. 10 Martin circulated the
petition after both judges had taken senior status, making them
ineligible to participate. 1 Judge Alice Batchelder responded by
7. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 735 (upholding the law school's admissions policy by a five-to-four
vote with Judges Daughtrey, Moore, Cole, and Clay joining Martin's opinion and Judges Boggs,
Siler, Batchelder, and Gilman dissenting).
8. See id. at 810-14 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (discussing concerns relating to the alleged
violations of internal procedures in granting this en banc review); id. at 773 (Clay, J., concurring)
(noting Judge Boggs's divulgence of internal information).
9. See id. at 810-14 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (alleging Martin violated then-Sixth Circuit
Internal Operating Procedure Rule 34(b)(2), which provided that subsequent appeals would be
returned to the original panel for a determination of "whether the second appeal should be
submitted to it for decision, or assigned to a panel at random," and that when a district court
judge sat on the original panel, the remaining two circuit judges were to decide whether to recall
that district judge or to select another circuit judge at random).
10. The petition was filed with the court on May 14, 2001. Grutter Docket Sheet, supra note
3, May 14, 2001 entry. Judge Alan Norris, a Ronald Reagan appointee, took senior status on July
1, 2001, and Judge Richard Suhrheinrich, a George H.W. Bush appointee, took senior status on
August 15, 2001. See Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,
http://www.fjc.gov/publicthome.nsf/hisj (for Judge Norris, search "Norris, Alan," then follow link;
for Judge Suhrheinrich, search "Suhrheinrich, Richard," then follow link) (last visited Dec. 26,
2007).
11. The Sixth Circuit's practice at that time was to allow senior judges to sit on the en banc
panel if they were "in regular active service at the time a poll was requested on the petition" for
an en banc hearing. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 812 n.44 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (quoting then-Sixth
Circuit Internal Operating Procedures rule 35(a)); see also Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 829-30 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (describing the Sixth Circuit's rule
regarding composition of the en banc court). Both Norris and Suhrheinrich were active at the
time the appellee filed her petition, but both apparently had taken senior status by the time a
poll was taken. Neither Norris nor Suhrheinrich participated in the en banc petition vote, as
reflected in their absence from the list of judges voting on the petition. Gratz, 277 F.3d 803
(ordering, on October 19, 2001, that Grutter v. Bollinger, along with the undergraduate
admissions case Gratz v. Bollinger, be heard initially en banc, and that oral argument in front of
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writing an internal memo to her colleagues contending that Martin
delayed the vote on the white student's request for a hearing en banc
until judges opposed to affirmative action took senior status. 12 Boggs's
dissent made public those accusations, a fact that one colleague called
"shameful,"13 and another "embarrassing and incomprehensible." 14
Accusations like those made in Grutter are consistent with the
attitudinal theory of judicial decisionmaking. Attitudinal theory
proffers that judges are political actors who make decisions that will
maximize their policy preferences. 15 Developed primarily by political
scientists, this approach has gained increasing currency in legal
scholarship. 16 If the theory is an accurate account of any judicial
action on the courts of appeals, we would expect, at a minimum, to see
evidence in the behavior of chief judges, who have more opportunities
than other circuit judges to achieve policy goals. Chief judges may
behave attitudinally in exercising their formal powers as well as their
informal authority and influence.
the three-judge panel, scheduled for October 23, 2001, be cancelled). The Sixth Circuit later
changed its en banc participation rule to allow only judges in active service at the time of the en
banc hearing to sit on the en banc court, avoiding the appearance of conflict with the statutory
authorization for en banc hearings. Id. (noting that the rule was changed to comply with 28
U.S.C. § 46(c) as amended in 1996).
12. See Grutter, 288 F.3d at 815 (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (concurring in Judge Boggs's
dissenting opinion setting forth her accusation); Charles Lane, Judges Spar Over Affirmative
Action, WASH. POST, June 7, 2003, at A4 (noting the accusations set forth in the memorandum).
13. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 752-53 (Moore, J., concurring) (accusing Judge Boggs and Judge
Batchelder, who concurred in Boggs's procedural appendix, of doing "a grave harm not only to
themselves, but to this court and even to the Nation as a whole" by "publiciz[ing] disagreements
over the internal workings of the court," and calling their conduct "nothing short of shameful")
14. Id. at 772 (Clay, J., concurring) (questioning Boggs's stated reasons for criticizing the
Chief Judge's procedural decisions, and arguing that Boggs was motivated by disagreement with
the majority rather than by any legitimate complaint); see also Lane, supra note 12 (reporting
that Chief Judge "Martin accused Batchelder and other conservatives of trying to delegitimize
the 6th Circuit's ruling to increase the chances it [would] be overturned").
15. For the best explication and defense of the attitudinal model, see generally JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AIrlTUDINAL MODEL (1993);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH, ATrITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED].
16. For a discussion of the development of this model in political science, see Tracey E.
George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1635, 1646-66 (1998). For a discussion of its relevance to legal scholars, see, for example,
Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003), which draws on the work of political scientists who study the Supreme
Court but writes from the perspective of a legal scholar who believes the law matters, and
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998), which tests a
multivariate model of judicial decisions on the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
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The attitudinal explanation for the events in Grutter is quite
simple and intuitive: Chief Judge Martin, a Carter appointee,
supported affirmative action and manipulated procedure to ensure the
case would be decided by judges who shared his view. 17 That is, he
substituted himself for the designated district judge who had heard
the interlocutory appeal because that judge, a Ford appointee, had
opposed intervention by individuals favoring affirmative action and
therefore seemed unlikely to support the law school's substantive
position.18  Republican appointees Batchelder and Boggs were
motivated to take the highly unusual step of publicly criticizing their
chief judge because of the political consequences of the chief judge's
actions. 19 Martin ultimately wrote the majority opinion for the en banc
court, which split largely along party lines.20 Batchelder and Boggs
17. At the time of the en banc petition (May 14, 2001), six Democratic appointees and five
Republican appointees sat on the Sixth Circuit Court: Carter appointee Martin; Reagan
appointees Boggs and Norris;' H.W. Bush appointees Suhrheinrich, Siler, and Batchelder; and
Clinton appointees Daughtrey, Moore, Cole, Clay, and Gilman. See Federal Judicial Center,
supra note 10, for biographies of each judge showing by which President each was appointed. If
Martin expected all judges to vote along party lines, then the Democratic appointees would have
had only a minimum-winning coalition. But the position of Clinton appointee Gilman may have
been unclear because he joined the court after seventeen years on the faculty of the University of
Memphis Law School. Federal Judicial Center, supra note 10 (search "Gilman, Ronald," then
follow link). He ultimately voted against the University of Michigan Law School's admissions
policy. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 815-18 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (concluding, consistent with Boggs's
opinion, that the Law School's policy "results in a de facto quota" in violation of Bakke, but
writing separately because he was "unpersuaded by [Boggs's] critique that no empirical link
exists between a critical mass of minority students and the perceived educational benefits or
[Boggs's] belief that race-neutral factors would be more likely to achieve the desired diversity of
experience than reliance on an applicant's race").
18. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 1999) (Stafford, D.J., dissenting)
(writing that the seventeen minority individuals and a nonprofit organization whose mission is
to preserve opportunities in higher education for minorities should not be permitted to
intervene). Senior District Judge William Stafford was appointed by President Ford to the
Northern District of Florida. Federal Judicial Center, supra note 10 (search "Stafford, William,"
then follow link).
19. In his concurring opinion, Judge Clay not only questioned Boggs's stated reasons for
publishing a procedural appendix, but also suggested that Boggs waited to complain until after
"opinions had been circulated" and "votes cast" in the hope "that if [the dissent's] substantive
basis for disagreement with the majority opinion [wa]s not convincing, then questioning the
procedural posture" would be. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 772 (Clay, J., concurring). Judge Moore
asserted that the dissent's "argument ... that the decisions of this court are not grounded in
principle and reasoned argument, but in power, and that the judges of this court manipulate and
ignore the rules in order to advance political agendas" was baseless. Id. at 753 (Moore, J.,
concurring).
20. Id. at 735. Democratic appointees Martin, Daughtrey, Moore, Cole, and Clay voted to
uphold the affirmative action program while Republican appointees Boggs, Siler, and Batchelder,
along with Democratic crossover Gilman, voted to strike it. See id. (listing the concurring and
dissenting judges, as well as the holding of the case).
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dissented. 21 Martin's defense that he followed proper procedure
indicates either an attempt to distract from his political motives or a
lack of self-awareness.
22
While the attitudinal model gains credence in law reviews,
circuit judges assert that their seemingly political actions in fact are
motivated by non-political goals, especially administrative ones.23 A
managerial account of judicial decisionmaking focuses on a judge's
workload as an overriding consideration-typically at the expense of
the law.24 Many judges claim that merely staying on top of growing
dockets is all-consuming and that speedy disposition is their highest
priority.25 The circuit courts struggle to handle nearly 70,000 appeals
filed annually with 179 authorized judgeships. 26 For a chief judge, the
21. Judge Batchelder wrote a separate dissent for the sole purpose of specifically concurring
in Boggs's procedural exegesis, saying, "Unless we expose to public view our failures to follow the
court's established procedures, our claim to legitimacy is illegitimate." Id. at 815 (Batchelder, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Siler did not concur in Boggs's inclusion of the procedural
appendix. Id. (Siler, J., dissenting). Judge Gilman also separately dissented, confining his
critique to the merits of the case, and conspicuously avoiding any mention of Boggs's discussion
of internal procedure. Id. at 815-18 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
22. Judges, not surprisingly, have been less than satisfied with the attitudinalists'
dismissal of their own accounts of their work. Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit
argued:
Ignoring the self-description of judges would be one thing if judging were a
mechanical process, or one performed by people incapable of self-consciousness. But
judging is a human activity, performed by human beings trained to think critically
about their endeavor. To understand it fully requires considering the way those who
perform the activity understand it.
Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1365 (1998). Attitudinalists are seeking to discern revealed, rather than stated, preferences. See
generally SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 15.
23. The most vocal critic on the bench has been D.C. Circuit Judge Edwards, although he
appears to have tempered his criticism. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 22, at 1335-36 (1998)
(writing to "debunk the myth ihat ideology is a principal determinant in decision making' and
"to refute the heedless observations of academic scholars who misconstrue and misunderstand
the work of the judges of the D.C. Circuit"); Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning
the "Politics" of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619,
641 (1985) (seeking to "show that the increasingly popular image of the federal appellate courts
as political bodies is a myth"); see also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology:
Public and Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 743, 747-53 (2005)
(discussing the debate between Edwards and legal scholars).
24. The managerial judging account was developed to describe how district judges have
expanded their pre-trial role to achieve early resolution of cases through non-adjudicative
processes rather than on the merits. See Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV.
374, 377-79 (1982).
25. See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 22 CONN. L. REV. 733, 744-48 (1990)
(presenting, as part of the final report of a special committee appointed by the Chief Justice
pursuant to Congressional authority, an examination of the caseload crisis on the federal courts
of appeals).
26. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director: Judicial
Business of the United States Courts 2005 Table B, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/
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burden is particularly acute. Chief judges are expected to manage the
oversized docket, ensuring speedy and just resolution of cases with
limited resources, while also continuing to do the work of an active
judge. Thus, the attitudinal story may be too narrow: its focus on
judges as policy maximizers ignores how workload may actually
prevent judges from considering policy.
The managerial judging account, like the attitudinal theory,
has intuitive appeal. In Grutter, Chief Judge Martin's decision not to
recall the district judge from Florida can be explained by a desire to
limit costs and expedite the appeal. Martin assigned himself as a
substitute in the interest of time and convenience because the case
was on an expedited calendar and involved multiple parties and more
than a dozen amici curiae. 27 As to the timing of the en banc vote,
Judge Clay argued:
It is ludicrous to think that with our circuit operating with only one-half of the active
judges' positions filled, and with over 4000 cases reaching our Court each year, the Chief
Judge or any members of this Court would single out any one particular case and
maneuver the system for a particular outcome.
2 8
The managerial judging story explains Chief Judge Martin's actions
by looking to the rules and practices developed to handle a heavy
caseload.
As Grutter demonstrates, chief judges' decisions offer an
especially valuable lens through which to view the internal conflict
between a judge's political goals and her notion of institutional
responsibility. Other judges have accused their chiefs of political
maneuvering, but such public accusations are rare. A paucity of these
claims, however, does not necessarily mean that policy-oriented
behavior is unusual. Chief judges may be too cautious (or wise) to use
their powers in brazenly political ways, relying instead on less visible
tools or informal powers to further their policy goals. Or their
colleagues may fail to alert us to strategic behavior because they do
not want to risk negative repercussions, create intracourt conflict, or
use limited resources to complain. Or those colleagues may agree with
the chief. If Judge Boggs had not taken the time to write a lengthy
appendices/b0.pdf, (reporting 68,743 filings for the term ending September 30, 2005); see also 28
U.S.C. § 44(a) (2000) (authorizing a specific number of judgeships for each circuit).
27. As Judge Moore explained in her concurrence, "Although [the local] rule states that the
third Sixth Circuit judge should be drawn at random, Chief Judge Martin has frequently
substituted himself in a variety of matters ... in order to avoid inconveniencing other circuit
judges." Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 757 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Moore, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 772 (Clay, J., concurring) ("Given the voluminous nature of the Court's docket and
the shortage of judicial resources, the case management tasks performed by the Chief Judge are




dissent, risking the alienation of his chief and colleagues, we would
not have known about the Grutter conflict. How do we study a
phenomenon that is generally invisible to the public? We propose
looking at one highly visible action that may test the relative
strengths of the attitudinal and managerial theories: the decision to
leave the chief position.
Unlike the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, who is
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to the
position and therefore must retire from the Court to leave the post,
chief circuit judges may step down from leadership but retain their
judgeships (in active or senior status). Moreover, a chief judge, unlike
the Chief Justice, may calculate who will replace her because chief
judge succession is based on seniority.29 Given her options and
information, a policy-oriented chief judge should time her departure to
ensure a replacement or court that will continue to favor her policy
preferences. If caseload pressures play a larger role in chief judges'
decisions, however, a chief judge's early departure should be driven
instead by increasing workload and related pressures from the
position.
To evaluate the relative strengths of these explanations, we
propose a strategic departure theory that draws on both attitudinal
and managerial accounts and generates hypotheses regarding chief
judge departure. We then test those hypotheses against a dataset that
includes 112 chief judges who ended their tenure before January 1,
2007. The following picture emerges: chief judges are less attentive to
policy goals as they are distracted by growing dockets and the
concomitant growth in the body of case law. Put differently, the
judicial utility function includes non-policy as well as policy concerns.
Accordingly, we see chief judges completing a smaller and smaller
fraction of their terms as caseloads grow larger and larger. This effect
is particularly significant considering that the statutorily prescribed
term limit is shorter now than it was twenty-five years ago. If we look
only at the number of years a judge serves as chief, the drop-off is
dramatic. 30 These departures generally are not tied to any policy
29. A strategic departure occurred as this article was going to press: D.C. Circuit Chief Judge
Douglas Ginsburg announced on January 24, 2008, that he was stepping down six months early
and returning to active status. His early departure allowed Judge David Sentelle, who otherwise
would have turned sixty-five before the end of Ginsburg's chief judge term, to succeed him. See
Press Release, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (Jan. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internetlhome.nsflcontent/announcements (select "Press Release-
New Chief Judge beginning February 11, 2008") (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
30. See Table 1, infra p. 26 (listing the three distinct approaches that have been adopted
over time: no term limits, an age limit of 70, and a term limit of seven years or until the judge
reaches 70, whichever is earlier).
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outcomes; rather, they reflect relative workload. The exception may be
seen in highly politicized circuits where the attitudinal model may
have explanatory power. This intercircuit difference also highlights
another problem with the attitudinal theory: most scholarship treats
individual circuits as part of a single institution-the courts of
appeals-rather than as a series of distinct though related
institutions.
Part I examines the evidence of policy-oriented decisionmaking
in federal courts. We consider how judges approach merits and non-
merits decisions and the relative influence of a judge's personal policy
goals on both. We then consider the distinctive approach of the
managerial model to the same decisions. Part II offers a history of the
chief judge position, considering the opportunities for policymaking, as
well as the possible constraints posed by management responsibilities.
Part III presents a strategic departure model. We examine what
attitudinal and managerial accounts predict about a chief judge's
exercise of her authority. Part IV presents the results. If chief judges
depart strategically, then we can infer that they believe their
colleagues (or at least their opponents) will use judicial power to
achieve policy goals and, further, that the chief judgeship is a tool for
doing so. If chief judges depart for other reasons, then the attitudinal
account's ability to explain judicial behavior is limited. Our results
indicate only limited support for the attitudinal model and greater
support for a managerial model, illustrating a paradoxical implication
of managerial judging. Rather than leading to outcomes inconsistent
with the law, chief judges' increasingly managerial role appears to
diminish the likelihood that they behave attitudinally.
I. INCENTIVES ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
Judges are at core human; thus, rational choice theory suggests
that judges will take actions likely to help them achieve their goals (or
maximize their utility).31 Classical legal theory assumes that judges
want to reach the correct legal holding. 32 Post-realist legal theory
31. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Things
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993).
32. Classical legal theory, or formalism, distinguishes judicial power from executive and
legislative powers based on its lack of decisionmaking discretion. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD
HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND,
FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 15 (1981) (observing that, under the classic model of
judicial function set forth by Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall, "judges do not make the
law but merely declare it; judges exercise neither political power nor personal will but merely
judgment, a process bridled by law and the discipline of a professional craft"); Thomas C. Grey,
Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1983) (describing the origins and evolution of
2008]
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generally adheres to the same basic assumption, but also draws on
other views of judicial decisionmaking for a richer view of judicial
actors. 33 Two positive theories may offer meaningful insight into the
behavior of circuit judges: attitudinal theory and managerial judging
theory. Attitudinal theory posits that judges desire to reach decisions
consistent with their policy views. Managerial judging theory suggests
that a predominant goal for contemporary judges is moving cases off
the docket without regard to the law or, by implication, policy. We
consider next what each theory predicts about the behavior of circuit
judges.
A. The Attitudinal Model
Federal courts are policymaking institutions. Federal judges,
then, make policy decisions. How do they decide? Legal scholars
generally assume or argue that judges follow the law when making
decisions. But much of legal scholarship focuses on disagreement or
confusion over what the law provides. In those cases, judges have
discretion. 34 How do judges decide when they have a meaningful
choice?
Traditional legal theory posits that judges will seek to discern
the correct legal principle-or "find the law" or "do justice"-without
regard to political views. 35 To do so, judges may follow a specific
jurisprudential approach. Any resulting disagreement between judges
classical legal orthodoxy beginning with the scientific theory of law espoused by Harvard Law
School's first dean, Christopher Columbus Langdell).
33. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960)
(explaining and testing the primary themes of legal realism); see also Frank B. Cross, Political
Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw.
U. L. REV. 251, 255-64 (1997) (describing the influence of other ideas on legal theory but the
continued acceptance of the idea that judges wish to follow prior decisions).
34. Even D.C. Circuit Judge Edwards, who has been highly critical of attitudinal models of
judging, recognizes that judges have opportunities to reach decisions consistent with their policy
preferences and will do so. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society:
Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
385, 389-90, 402 (1983-1984) (explaining that, in a given term, judges will encounter a small
percentage of cases in which the proper decision is sufficiently unclear that they will have to
exercise discretion); see also BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164-65
(1921) (describing judicial discretion as to law); R. Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial
Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 377 (1975)
(describing judicial discretion as existing when more than one possible answer has reasonably
sound support).
35. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 5 (1995) ("Judges ought to
place their faith not in politics but in reason; and this requires that they endeavour to base
controversial decisions on apolitical principles .... "); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal
Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 502-05 (1996) (book review) (discussing the belief held by classical
legal thinkers that the judicial role is confined to deducing legal rules from basic principles).
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reflects a true dispute over what the law dictates, not merely a conflict
in the judges' relative ideological positions. Standard doctrinal
scholarship assumes that judges seek to reach "correct" results, but
faulty reasoning may prevent judges from succeeding.
Political scientists have taken a different view. 36 They too have
sought to explain how federal judges make decisions. However,
political scientists are writing from a background of studying elected
bodies as institutions, rather than "the law" as an institution.37 Not
surprisingly, they find political explanations for judicial disagreement.
Armed with sophisticated methods, political scientists have offered
empirical studies showing that judges, when possible, take positions
that increase the probability of outcomes consistent with their
ideology.38 The most clearly established relationship is between a
judge's preferences and her votes on the merits of a case, as reflected
in the most widely (though not universally) accepted model, the
attitudinal model. More recent scholarship, often termed "new
institutional" or "strategic," has expanded our understanding of
judicial behavior, revealing policy-oriented decisions at other points in
the legal process.
1. The Role of Policy Preferences in Votes on the Merits
The primary role of the judge is to resolve disputes brought to
the court, whether between the State and a defendant or between
36. For an intellectual history of the political science study of the courts, see generally Lee
Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 783 (2003).
37. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); SHELDON
GOLDMAN & TOM JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1985). Legal
scholars, unlike social scientists, frequently are guided by the desire to rationalize judicial
policymaking in a democracy. Lawyers and legal academics help to legitimize Article III courts
by presenting the judge as a neutral and reasoned decision maker and by emphasizing the
primacy of rules. As Justice Felix Frankfurter explained the position: "Our judicial system is
absolutely dependent upon a popular belief that it is as untainted in its workings as the finite
limitations of disciplined human minds and feelings make possible." FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE
SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 78 (Philip
Kurland ed., 1970).
38. The most cutting-edge work in political science is seeking not simply to explain past
decisions but to predict future ones. Two political scientists, Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn,
joined forces with two law professors, Pauline Kim and Theodore Ruger, to test a multivariate
forecasting model, in which a primary variable was ideological direction, against the predictions
of legal experts. The model and the experts predicted the outcome of Supreme Court decisions for
the 2002 Term. The model won. See Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger &
Pauline T. Kim, Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making, 2 PERSP.
POL. 761, 761 (2004); Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn,
The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1150 (2004).
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private parties. An appellate judge's task is to review the decisions of
lower court judges.3 9 The appellate judge generally faces a binary
choice: affirm or reverse (or perhaps affirm in part and reverse in
part). On a multi-judge panel, the judge votes and then authors or
joins an opinion consistent with that vote. Attitudinal theory began as
an effort to explain that primary decision, and its greatest success has
been in explaining votes on the merits.
Attitudinal theory states that a judge, when possible, will vote
for the outcome in a case that is closest to her policy position.40 A
judge's personal policy preferences interact with the salient
characteristics of a dispute, or "case stimuli," to produce a position on
the appropriate outcome. 41 Liberalness, or conservativeness, is the
judge's "attitude" about what is at stake in the case. 42 Hence, a liberal
judge will vote in favor of the criminal defendant against the State
because the judge's ideology includes certain views on the actions of
the State and the rights of criminal defendants. 43 Likewise, a
conservative judge, for the same reasons, will vote against the
criminal defendant. The analysis is the same in various other types of
cases.
44
39. See PAUL CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL
2 (1976) ("The traditional appeal calls for an examination of the rulings below to assure that they
are correct, or at least within the range of error the law for sufficient reasons allows the primary
decision-maker."); ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 3-4 (1940) (describing
appellate review as serving a two-fold function: error-correction and uniformity check).
40. See Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making,
86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 326-28 (1992) (setting forth the attitudinal model and testing it
against a legal model).
41. See SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 15, at 86-96, 312
(explaining the model's central tenet that "justices base their decisions on the merits on the facts
of the case juxtaposed against their personal policy preferences").
42. Glendon Schubert, drawing on the work of social psychologists, was the first to propose
a model of judicial decisionmaking based on Justices' attitudes. See GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE
JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963, at 5-6
(1965). David Rohde and Harold Spaeth expanded on Schubert's model with a construct of
attitudes based on a set of interrelated beliefs and further observed that goals, rules, and
situations influence judicial behavior generally. See generally DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976). For a discussion of Schubert's and Rohde
and Spaeth's work, see SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 15, at 67-
69; Jeffrey A. Segal, Donald R. Songer & Charles M. Cameron, Decision Making on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 227, 231-32 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); Harold J.
Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS, supra, at 296, 307.
43. See, e.g., Epstein, Knight & Martin, supra note 36, at 794 (explaining that the
attitudinal theory, which they note is only one theory and not theirs, states that "the votes of
judges on the merits of cases will reflect their sincerely-held ideological (read: liberal or
conservative) attitudes over particular matters of public policy" if those judges have life-tenure,
agenda control, and the final word).
44. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah Jones Merritt, Judicial Hostility
Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO
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The Supreme Court has been the primary focus of attitudinal
studies. Justices have demonstrated a strong ideological influence on
their votes on the merits. We can predict with remarkable accuracy
the decision of an individual Justice in a particular case without
knowing much about the relevant precedent. 45 This idea initially may
appear to undermine the central tenet of legal education: that
learning how to reason logically from prior decisions equips lawyers to
predict how judges will act in future cases. But the Supreme Court is
not a typical court. The Justices control their agenda, granting
certiorari to a tiny fraction of petitions.46 Hence, they largely are
deciding cases for which the existing law is unclear, limited, or even
nonexistent; that is, where the law does not clearly mandate an
ST. L.J. 1675, 1715 tbl.II (1999) (finding that Democratic circuit court appointees were much
more likely than Republican appointees to favor unions); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on
the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 491, 501 tbl.7 (finding
evidence of ideological voting in a range of issue areas including criminal procedure, labor,
private economic, and torts); Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative
Approaches to the Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 963, 976 tbl.2 (1992) (finding, after controlling for other factors, that Carter and
Johnson appointees were significantly more likely than other appointees to support First
Amendment speech rights in obscenity suits and that Reagan appointees were much less likely).
See generally Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-
Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999) (meta-analyzing 84 empirical studies of the relationship
between judges' party identification and judicial decisions across a range of subjects, and
concluding that party affiliation explains a substantial amount of the variance in the ideological
direction of judicial decisions, particularly in federal courts (explaining 48% of the variance)).
45. Some research attempts to consider the influence of legally relevant facts as well as
attitudes. But the definition of relevant facts is much narrower than that used in law, and the
hypothesized influence is primarily in its relationship to the underlying views of the Justices.
Hence, a Justice who generally favors broad police search power may consistently view homes as
different from automobiles. See, e.g., George & Epstein, supra note 40, at 328 (demonstrating
that legally relevant variables as well as political ones have an effect on the decisions of
Justices); Kevin McGuire, Obscenity, Libertarian Values, and Decision Making in the Supreme
Court, 18 AM. POL. Q. 47, 47-53 (1990) (presenting a positive theory, including political and legal
factors, of Supreme Court Justices' votes in obscenity cases); Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting
Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981, 78 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 891, 892 (1984) (explaining that earlier fact-based models used to predict Supreme
Court decisions were not very successful, as they incorporated more variables (including many
facts) than cases, and that later attempts to improve these models concentrated on limiting the
number of variables). From the attitudinal perspective, the nature of the action, rather than a
particular doctrine, prompts a specific ideological response. See SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED, supra note 15, at 312-14 ("To phrase the matter from the standpoint of
attitude theory [whose intellectual origin is psychology,] . . . . behavior may be said to be a
function of the interaction between an actor's attitude toward an 'object' (i.e., persons, places,
institutions, and things) and that actor's attitude toward the situation in which the object is
encountered." (quoting MILTON ROKEACH, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND VALUES: A THEORY OF
ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE 112-22 (1968))).
46. See Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United
States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 171 (2001) (reporting that the
Supreme Court grants review to less than 4% of paid petitions).
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outcome.47 Given such discretion, Justices have significant freedom to
vote their policy preferences-and they do.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals are less frequently a part of
attitudinal studies and also are less likely to support attitudinal
hypotheses. The majority of circuit cases allow little decisionmaking
discretion. While estimates vary, judges and scholars agree that more
than half (and perhaps as much as three-quarters) of the circuit
docket presents "easy" questions. 48 A judge's decision is easy because
existing law is undisputed or the standard of review is highly
deferential or both. In those cases, a judge's policy goals lose out to
other goals, including avoiding the embarrassment of en banc or
Supreme Court reversal, limiting time spent on uninteresting or
marginal disputes, and building collegiality with colleagues. The
attitudinal theory is not weakened by this fact because it does not
claim to explain constrained decisionmaking.
Attitudinal theory, if robust, should be able to explain the
decisions of appellate judges on circuit courts when they are deciding
under circumstances akin to those characterizing the Supreme Court.
An obvious example is en banc decisions. While the circuit courts have
little discretion over the cases they must assign to three-judge panels
for review, they have complete discretion over the cases they decide as
an entire body. 49 A majority of active judges must vote to grant en
banc hearing. This selection process creates a presumption that the
47. For a discussion of the Court's exercise of its agenda control, see H.W. PERRY, DECIDING
TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991), and Lawrence A.
Baum, Case Selection and Decisionmaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 443
(1993).
48. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 34. Based on his experience as a D.C. Circuit judge,
Edwards estimated "that approximately one-half of the cases decided are easy; the pertinent
legal rules seem to me unambiguous and their application to the facts appears clear." He then
added, regarding the remaining one-half of the cases:
A dispute falling into this category, I believe, admits of only one "right answer". . .[in
the remaining one-half], the answers are not so clear. In only a relatively small subset
of these, however, do I feel I may and must exercise what I will call "discretion." Using
rough numbers, I would say that in only five to fifteen percent of the disputes that
come before me do I conclude ... that to dispose of the appeal I must rely on some
significant measure of discretion.
Id. Edwards describes the remaining subset as "hard cases," and allows that judges may be
influenced in such cases by their views on the underlying social issue. Id.; see also J. Edward
Lumbard, Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 29, 36 (1968)
(asserting that "[m]ost appellate judges would agree that the result in about seventy-five per
cent of appeals is clearly foreseeable after argument, regardless of which judges sit on those
cases," but that the remaining 25% are close cases).
49. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 46 (2000) (providing statutory authority for en banc sittings); FED.
R. APP. P. 35 (providing procedural rules governing en banc hearings). For a detailed discussion
of the history and modern use of en banc review, see generally Tracey E. George, The Dynamics
and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999).
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cases are more likely to involve difficult, complex, highly political, or
at least important questions. That is, en banc cases should, like
Grutter, be similar to those heard by the Supreme Court. Indeed,
empirical studies have found that circuit judges in en banc cases
exhibit the same relatively predictable decisionmaking process as
Justices on the Supreme Court.
50
If attitudinal theory explained circuit judge behavior only in en
banc cases, it would offer limited insight into the actions of those
judges because en banc rulings, while among the most significant, are
rare. 51 But attitudinalists also have had success explaining the votes
of judges in other cases that likely involve discretion. Because circuit
judges are constrained by precedent when it is clear, they should
disagree primarily when the law is murky and they must rely on
discretion. By focusing on cases in which a panelist dissents or a
unanimous panel disagrees with a district judge, scholars have found
additional evidence of ideological voting.52 The results are most
dramatic in appeals raising politicized issues such as civil rights and
liberties, criminal law, and labor law. 53 In these politically salient
50. See George, supra note 16, at 1678-86 (explaining that empirical studies of the internal
and external influences on Supreme Court Justices "have merit in the context of the en banc
courts of appeals"); CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT 88 (1999)
(discussing the fact that "[w]hile en banc review and appeal to the Supreme Court are distinct
judicial conventions, both still involve the use of discretion that is political").
51. See George & Solimine, supra note 46, at 176-78 figs.1 & 2, 200 app.1 (estimating that
less than one percent of cases are heard en banc); see also A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note, En
Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities
(Part 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 564, 608 app.IV (1965) (finding that only 423 cases were decided
en banc by all circuits from 1940 to 1964, and that only 1.5% of decisions in 1964 were rendered
en banc).
52. See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 117
(2006) ("The scholarship devoted to appellate reversal strongly indicates that the match (or
mismatch) of preferences between reviewing judges and those under review matters a great
deal."); Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 44, at 1736-37 (finding that judicial attributes
are more influential in predicting outcomes on politically divisive issues as compared to
nondivisive issues); Goldman, supra note 44, at 491, 504 (conducting an examination of
nonunanimous courts of appeals decisions to find judicial behavior representing political and
economic attitudes); Donald R. Songer, Consensual and Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous
Opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 225, 225 (1982) (observing
that most appellate court research looks only at divided decisions).
53. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting
Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1955-1986, 43 W. POL. Q. 317, 327-28 (1990)
(hypothesizing that new political issues may explain the increased partisan effects on judges);
Songer & Haire, supra note 44, at 978 (arguing that judges may respond differently to politically
sensitive or divisive issues like those presented in civil liberties cases than to other issues on
their agenda).
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areas, circuit judges appear affected by ideology even in unanimous
decisions.
54
2. The Role of Policy Preferences in Non-Merits Decisions
It seems noncontroversial that a judge's votes on the merits in
close cases will be related to the judge's policy preferences. First, the
relationship between the judge's vote and the outcome in the case is
clear. Second, a judge's ideology is most relevant in cases where the
judge has some discretion. But are judges strategic? Will they consider
policy when making decisions that indirectly affect outcomes? If
judges are policy-oriented, then all of their actions should be
influenced, in part, by policy consequences.
Policy may actually play a greater role in decisions not clearly
connected with case outcomes. While judges may express policy
preferences more easily through votes on the merits, such votes are
transparent, and purely political motives are easy to detect.55 Thus a
judge might choose less direct methods to pursue attitudinal goals
because she can do so with decreased risk of discovery. Such veiled
acts also can be difficult for researchers to discover. Fortunately, we
have found some visible actions that would reflect an underlying
attitudinal motive if one exists. Various studies have examined the
degree to which judges calculate the policy consequences of decisions
to hear cases, 56 to write opinions, 57 and to retire.
58
Agenda control is a crucial power for policymaking bodies. It
allows them to determine which issues to address, as well as when
54. Legal scholar Richard Revesz, for example, has found this to be true for D.C. Circuit
judges in regulatory cases. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and
the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1771-72 (1997).
55. For example, another judge on a panel may blow the whistle on a colleague who votes
ideologically. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience
to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2173-76
(1998) (describing the phenomenon and proposing a panel assignment system that ensures the
presence of a watchdog judge on each panel).
56. For Supreme Court studies, see, for example, Jeffrey A. Segal & Robert Boucher,
Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials
on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995). For courts of appeals studies, see, for example,
Micheal Giles, Thomas Walker & Christopher Zorn, Setting a Judicial Agenda: The Decision to
Grant En Banc Review in U.S. Courts of Appeals, 68 J. POL. 852 (2006).
57. For Supreme Court studies, see, for example, LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). For courts of appeals studies, see, for example, HETTINGER,
LINDQUIST & MARTINEK, supra note 52.
58. For Supreme Court studies, see, for example, Timothy M. Hagle, Strategic Retirements:
A Political Model of Turnover on the United States Supreme Court, 15 POL. BEHAV. 25 (1993). For
courts of appeals studies, see, for example, Albert H. Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial
Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 1869-2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143 (2006).
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and how to do so. The Supreme Court sets its agenda through the
highly selective certiorari process. 59 Policy-minded Justices should be
more likely to vote to grant certiorari when they disagree with the
ideological direction of the lower court's decision, or when socially
important issues are at stake. Indeed, studies have found that
attitudinal factors, along with other variables, explain most Supreme
Court certiorari grants. 60 Unlike Justices, circuit judges spend most of
their time deciding cases on their mandatory docket, but they have
complete discretion over the cases heard en banc. Circuit judges
appear to use their agenda-setting power, the decision to grant en
banc review, in the same way Justices use their agenda-setting power,
the decision to grant certiorari.61
Appellate judges must vote in every case, but authoring or
joining an opinion is a choice. What explains a judge's decision to sign
onto an opinion or to write separately? Walter Murphy may have been
the first to observe, based on an examination of Justices' papers, the
intra-Court bargaining whereby a Justice offers to trade her vote and
concurrence in an opinion for changes in the content of the opinion. 62
This strategic account focuses on the collective nature of federal
appellate courts, where bargaining, compromise, and accommodation
are necessary for judges to affect outcomes. That is, a policy-oriented
judge will rationally vote contrary to her preferred position if it moves
the majority's position closer to her own.63 While it rejects the sincere
59. Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Supreme Court has had an extremely limited
original jurisdiction which accounts for only a handful of cases each year. For a history of the
Supreme Court's certiorari policy and relevant statistics, see RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1580-1612 (5th ed. 2003).
60. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in
a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions, 94
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 101, 101 (2000) (developing and testing a strategic model of Supreme Court
certiorari decisions where the Court responds to signals and indices from courts of appeals,
termed a "judicial signaling game," and finding that a conservative Court was more likely to
review liberal decisions by liberal lower courts); Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Dynamics and
Determinants of Agenda Change in the Rehnquist Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS, supra note
42, at 251, 251-53 (discussing research demonstrating that "[t]he factors that govern the
selection of cases and the construction of an annual agenda are closely tied to the factors that
explain the justices' decisions on the merits of cases").
61. See George, supra note 49, at 236-72 (finding that courts were more likely to rehear
cases en banc when the ideological direction of a panel's decision was contrary to the circuit's, the
ideological composition of the panel was different from the circuit's, and/or the panel was divided
or reversed the district court); Giles, Walker & Zorn, supra note 56, at 852-65 (analyzing "the
influence of ideological and legal factors on the grant of en banc rehearing in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals--one of the few instances of agenda control in the lower federal courts").
62. See WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY 56-68 (1964) (documenting vote-trading
exchanges reflected in the papers of Justices Murphy, Stone, and Taft).
63. For empirical evidence from the Supreme Court, see EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 57;
FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME
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voting assumption of the attitudinal model, the strategic model builds
on the same core idea: judges make decisions to further their policy
goals, and one such decision is coalition formation.
Federal appellate judges have life tenure.6 4 They may leave the
court voluntarily or die in office. A policy-oriented judge should try to
time her departure to increase the probability of a like-minded
replacement. Consistent with the attitudinal and strategic models,
scholars have found that Supreme Court Justices are "keenly aware of
the importance of membership change on the Court's decisions" and
that political factors play a significant role in Justices' decisions to
remain on or leave the Court.65 The evidence on circuit judges, by
contrast, is less clear. Studies have found that circuit judges are more
likely to retire when they share the same political affiliation as the
sitting President.66  But financial considerations-in particular,
pension qualification-appear to play a larger role than political
ones.6
7
The attitudinal theory offers crucial insights into judicial
behavior and has proven to be a rigorous model of appellate judicial
decisionmaking. The model, however, fails to respond to one of the
most dramatic recent changes in the work of appellate courts: a nearly
COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 57-76 (2000). For empirical evidence from the courts of appeals,
see HETTINGER, LINDQUIST & MARTINEK, supra note 52 at 75-78.
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
65. See Gary King, Appointments to the Supreme Court: Adding Systematic Explanation to
Probabilistic Description, 15 AM. POL. Q. 377, 383-84 (1987) (finding that Justices time
retirements to occur at an ideologically optimal time); Christopher J.W. Zorn & Steven R. Van
Winkle, A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789-1992, 22 POL. BEHAV. 145,
146-50 (2000) (finding that political factors, along with personal considerations and institutional
influences, explain Justices' tenure decisions). But see Richard L. Vining, Jr., Christopher Zorn &
Susan Navarro Smelcer, Judicial Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, 1790-1868: Frustration,
Resignation, and Expiration on the Bench, 20 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 198, 207-10 (2006) (reporting
that institutional and personal factors, such as finances and health, played a much larger role
than political ones in the tenure decisions of early Justices). While Justices, including the Chief
Justice, may seek to time their departures to affect who replaces them, they are working with
complex probabilistic determinations. A Chief Justice may choose to step down under a specific
President in hopes that his replacement will hold the President's ideological positions. This will
depend on both the nomination and confirmation processes as well as the new appointee's actual
behavior on the Court. The Chief Justice, then, does not have the chief judge's luxury of
predicting with near certainty the judicial behavior of his replacement. In fact, a Chief Justice
may not even be correct in predicting the President who will replace him, as Earl Warren
learned to his dismay.
66. See Deborah Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of Turnover on the Lower
Federal Courts, 1900-1987, 52 J. POL. 457, 464, 466-73 (1990); James F. Spriggs II & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirements on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991,
48 POL. RES. Q. 573, 573, 577, 588-90, 592 (1995).
67. See Albert H. Yoon, Love's Labor's Lost: Judicial Tenure Among Lower Federal Court
Judges, 1945-2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1041, 1045-49, 1052, 1056-57 (2003) (presenting
evidence from an empirical study of judicial tenure decisions).
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overwhelming growth in caseload. Combining data over a large period
fails to take into account the ability of judges to focus on policy as they
must decide more cases and keep track of a rapidly expanding body of
case law. Moreover, models rarely include variables related to the
changing workload of the courts. We contend that the managerial
judging concept provides a positive account of judging on appellate
courts because it considers the possible effects of the work
environment of judging.
B. The Managerial Judging Model
The attitudinal model counters the legal model's impartial
jurist paradigm by revealing the influences of policy preferences on
judicial decisionmaking. The managerial judging model also questions
this paradigm, but on the basis of workload. Although the managerial
judging theory shares the attitudinal theory's focus on judges as
rational actors, it predicts that judges seek to maximize much
different preferences. That is, judges desire to move cases off the
docket and have a sense of control over workload.
The attitudinal and strategic models largely ignore evidence
that appellate judges are increasingly guided by non-policy goals as a
result of workload. 68 Or they characterize certain actions-increased
use of summary dispositions, decreased grants of en banc and
certiorari petitions, limiting or refusing oral argument, or the
nonpublication of opinions-as the product of specific policy views.
The difficulty is that these varied acts lack a consistent ideological
correlate. They span issue areas, case types, and parties. The
appellant-whether a corporation or an underdog-is less likely to
receive meaningful review of the trial court's judgment in a world of
managerial appellate judges.
Judith Resnick coined the term "managerial judges" to describe
the modern role of trial judges in the federal courts.69 Facing a
"mountain of work," district judges have embraced the tools created by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to persuade, cajole, and even
coerce parties to end suits quickly. 70 Resnick carefully distinguishes
68. But see Ahmed Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 20 (2004) (considering the influence of workload and other variables on
district judge decisions to publish opinions, and finding that lower caseload, controlling for other
variables, increased the probability that a judge published an opinion).
69. See Resnick, supra note 24, at 378; see also Maximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial
Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 874-85 (2005) (describing
Resnick's managerial model).
70. Resnick, supra note 24, at 378-80.
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justifiable actions made necessary by changes in the law from those
"initiated by the judges themselves in response to workload
pressures."71 Resnick offered her model as an empirically informed
critique of modern case management practices, but her ideas extend
beyond that purpose and that application.
72
Appellate judges have adjusted their practices and even their
rules to resolve more cases and to do so more quickly, often at the
expense of merits consideration. For example, circuits have increased
their reliance on staff attorneys to screen cases and suggest decisions,
have limited the time for oral argument and even its availability, and
have strictly enforced technical rules to move cases off the docket.73
And the decreasing publication of opinions has reduced the value of
appeal for litigants on both sides: a successful public interest law
group fails to get precedent on which to build a new legal doctrine, and
successful established interests are left without citable cases to use in
foreclosing future suits. 74 While those who favor the status quo may be
better off with managerial judging, the advantage is not sufficient to
support an attitudinal account of these actions.
II. LEADERSHIP ON THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is the "first among
equals," or at least he can be. 75 Specific Court eras frequently are
71. Id. at 391.
72. Ahmed Taha's incorporation of the workload variable into a study of district judge's
opinion publication decisions is an example. Taha, supra note 68, at 6, 13, 25. Maximo Langer
has applied the model to international criminal proceedings. Langer, supra note 69.
73. See, e.g., Richard J. Cardamone, Foreword: How an Expanding Caseload Impacts
Federal Appellate Procedures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 286-90 (1999); William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1290, 1290, 1293
(1996); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 279-92 (1996).
74. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1442-83 (2004) (describing the history and current state
of nonpublication in appellate courts and the dangers that the practice presents); Sarah E. Ricks,
The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A Case Study of the
Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REV. 217,
228-35 (2006) (arguing that unpublished opinions "create[] a number of risks for courts and
litigants, including: doctrinal shifts from precedential decisions; uncertainty about the
persuasive value of non-binding decisions issued by the hierarchically superior court; mistaken
predictions of an opinion's future usefulness; and unpredictability of judicial outcomes"); David
C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate Over Unpublished
Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1676-90 (2005) (arguing against the use of unpublished
opinions because it "provides incentives for strategic game-playing by appellate courts and
sophisticated appellate lawyers").
75. David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in
AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 506, 506 (Sheldon
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known by the name of the Chief: the "Warren Court" is a short-hand
for numerous landmark decisions as well as a particular
jurisprudential philosophy.7 6  The Chief Justice's institutional
responsibilities can have clear political implications. 77  The
Independent Counsel statute granted nearly unfettered discretion to
the Chief Justice to appoint a panel that, in turn, named the
Independent Counsel.78 Other less obviously political powers, such as
opinion assignment when in the majority and the conference privilege
of speaking first and voting last, carry substantial policy import.79
The circuit chief judge, by contrast, may appear as only "one
among equals."80 Circuit court eras are not known by the names of
Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 1978) (arguing that Chief Justices have the potential to exert both
"social" and "task" leadership). Various qualitative and quantitative studies have demonstrated
the potential and real influence of Chief Justices. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist,
Doctrinal and Strategic Influences of the Chief Justice: The Decisional Significance of the Chief
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1665 (2006) (studying the effect that Chief Justices Rehnquist and
Burger had on the decisionmaking of their respective courts); Sue Davis, The Chief Justice and
Judicial Decision-Making: The Institutional Basis for Leadership on the Supreme Court, in
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 135 (Cornell W.
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (examining the influence of Chief Justice Rehnquist);
Joseph F. Kobylka, Leadership on the Supreme Court of the United States: Chief Justice Burger
and the Establishment Clause, 42 W. POL. Q. 545 (1989) (arguing that Chief Justice Burger, for
many reasons, failed to lead the court effectively).
76. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHY (1983).
77. See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist's Appointments to the FISA Court:
An Empirical Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239 (2007) (exploring the ideological views of the
Chief Justice's appointees to this controversial court).
78. The Independent Counsel statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (2000), delegates to a special
three-judge panel the power to appoint the Independent Counsel and to oversee the counsel's
work. Id. §§ 591, 593. The Chief Justice names the judges to that panel. Id. § 49(d) ("The Chief
Justice of the United States shall designate and assign three circuit court judges or justices, one
of whom shall be a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to
such division of the court. Not more than one judge or justice or senior or retired judge or justice
may be named to such division from a particular court."). Chief Justice Rehnquist selected two
conservative judges-D.C. Circuit Judge David Sentelle and Eleventh Circuit Judge Peter Fay-
and one liberal judge-Fourth Circuit Senior Judge John Butzner-to the panel that ultimately
chose Ken Starr. John Q. Barrett, Special Division Agonistes, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 17, 44-47
tbl.1 (2000) (listing the judges who have served on the special division and the independent
counsel appointed by each such division).
79. See, e.g., Kobylka, supra note 75 (enumerating, in his examination of Chief Justice
Burger's failure to lead the Court, the ways in which a Chief Justice may influence his colleagues
and the Court); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion
Assignment on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RES. Q. 551, 559-61 (2004) (finding that Chief
Justices are likely to use opinion assignments to further policy goals when the conference
majority is greater than five, the case is important, and the assignment is made earlier in the
term).
80. Second Circuit Chief Judge Edward Lumbard made this claim in an article advocating
for certain changes in court policy and structure. He characterizes circuit chief judges in this way
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their chiefs.8' A chief judge's administrative duties often appear
significant in their demand on a chiefs time but merely bureaucratic
in their likely effect on court decisions.8 2 The chief must oversee the
circuit's budget, monitor the hiring and firing of staff, and deal with
the numerous requests for building improvements and equipment.
8 3
However, as we know from studies of administrative agencies,
seemingly benign administrative power can affect substantive
outcomes.
8 4
Chief judges hold many institutional powers, including day-to-
day management of a federal court of appeals, which may be used to
further a particular agenda.8 5 They oversee the assignment of judges
to panels and panels to cases,8 6 request visiting judges from other
circuits,8 7 manage the participation of senior (semi-retired) judges,
88
because they must persuade their colleagues to agree to any decision (at least enough other
judges to create a majority). Interestingly, his discussion makes clear that he had particular luck
doing so. Lumbard, supra note 48, at 42.
81. One exception might be Learned Hand's leadership of the Second Circuit during the
1940s and early 1950s, which has led some to call it the Hand court. E.g., MARVIN SCHICK,
LEARNED HAND'S COURT (1970).
82. See Will Shafroth, Survey of the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 F.R.D. 243, 284
(1967) (reporting, based on a 1966 survey of all circuit judges, that "[t]he Chief Judges all have
heavy administrative duties on which they spend from one-third to one-half their time").
83. See id.; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, TEMPLATE FOR CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGES' DESKBOOK
12-17 (2001) [hereinafter CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGES' DESKBOOK] (describing the circuit-wide
administrative duties assigned to the chief judge).
84. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971) (arguing that bureaucrats are able to use their power to impose their preferences upon the
legislature); Cheryl L. Eavey & Gary J. Miller, Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or
Bargaining?, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 719, 730 (1984) (finding support for a bureaucratic-legislative
bargaining theory); Thomas H. Hammond, Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and
Bureaucratic Politics, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 379 (1984) (examining how bureaucratic structure
influences the inner workings and policy output of administrative agencies).
85. See generally CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGES' DESKBOOK, supra note 83 (providing a description
of the duties performed by circuit judges).
86. Congress has authorized circuits to decide cases in three-judge panels, but it has not
addressed the process of assigning judges to those panels, except for the Federal Circuit. 28
U.S.C. § 46(b) (2000). Chief judges have statutory authority to assign visiting, senior, and
designated district judges to panels, id. §§ 292, 294, 295, and oversee circuit staff. Id. § 332. Not
surprisingly, then, chiefs have varying degrees of discretion and responsibility for the panel
assignment process. Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg, for example, reported that "[iun the Second
Circuit, it is the responsibility of the chief judge to select and organize the composition of the
panels of three judges." Wilfred Feinberg, The Office of Chief Judge of a Federal Court of
Appeals, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 374 (1984). For a detailed examination of individual circuit
practices (with particular consideration of the power of the chief judge), see Professor Jay Brown,
Circuit Practices (Jan. 1, 2000) (unpublished appendix to J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren
Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037 (2000)),
available at http://www.law.du.eduljbrownlcourts/Default.htm (follow "Circuit Practices" link).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 293.
88. Id. § 294.
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designate district judges to sit on the circuit,8 9 and control special
three-judge district court panels. 90 Chief judges also manage court
councils, create ad hoc committees to consider institutional questions,
and represent the court in various settings. Moreover, chief judges
continue to hear cases. 91 The chief is always the most senior judge on a
panel, including an en banc sitting, allowing the chief, if in the
majority, to assign the opinion.
92
A. The Creation and Selection of Chief Judges
Chief judges are relatively new to the lower federal courts. The
first Judiciary Act established a Chief Justiceship for the Supreme
Court 93 and created lower courts.94 But Congress did not establish a
leadership position for these new "district" and "circuit" courts. The
Evarts Act of 1891 created the circuit courts of appeals and assigned
the most senior judge on a three-judge circuit panel the role of
presiding judge.95  However, the Act delegated administrative
powers-such as hiring a court clerk and marshal, creating internal
operating procedures, and designating district judges to sit on
panels-to the circuit court of appeals as a whole. 96 Thus, the judges
collectively controlled the day-to-day operations.
In 1914, Yale Law Professor William Howard Taft, the former
President and Sixth Circuit judge, advocated for the establishment of
89. Id. § 292.
90. Id. § 2284.
91. See Patricia M. Wald.... Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127,
1130 (1992) ('Many, if not most, Chief Judges maintain a full calendar of cases as I did .... "); cf.
RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CHARLES W. NIHAN, ADMINISTERING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: A
SURVEY OF CHIEF JUDGES' APPROACHES AND PROCEDURES 6 tbl.1 (1982) (reporting, based on
interviews of every chief judge and circuit executive, that only four of twelve chief judges heard
fewer cases than they heard prior to becoming chief judge).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 45(b) ('The chief judge shall have precedence and preside at any session of
the court which he attends. Other circuit judges of the court in regular active service shall have
precedence and preside according to the seniority of their commissions. Judges whose
commissions bear the same date shall have precedence according to seniority in age. The circuit
justice, however, shall have precedence over all the circuit judges and shall preside at any
session which he attends.").
93. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73.
94. See id. The Act created "district" and "circuit" courts. Both acted essentially as trial
courts although the circuit courts had some limited appellate authority over districts courts.
District courts acted through a single judge, while circuit courts acted through a three-judge
panel comprised of one district judge and two Supreme Court Justices. Id.
95. See Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, §§ 2-3, 26 Stat. 826, 826-27. Seniority was first by court
of appointment (Justice over circuit judge over district judge), and then by time of appointment.
Id. § 2, 26 Stat. at 827.
96. Id. §§ 2-3, 26 Stat. at 826-27. The Attorney General had responsibility for obtaining
physical space for judges to work and hear cases. Id. § 9, 26 Stat. at 829.
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court leadership. 97 He argued that Congress should grant certain
judges management responsibility and control over court dockets and
related tasks.98 Shortly after his appointment to the Supreme Court in
1921, Chief Justice Taft finally persuaded Congress to create an
organization consisting of the most senior judge from each circuit.99
The new Judicial Council met annually to craft procedure and
standards for handling judicial business. The Council also proposed
legislation on federal jurisdiction and procedure and on changes in the
judicial structure (including new judgeships). 100
The most senior judge in each circuit found himself with
greater governance authority within the judiciary, contributing to the
development of judicial rules and policy and, outside the judiciary,
speaking as a representative of his colleagues. The Council effectively
established a principal for each court. Senior judges had taken on
informal responsibilities before, but the Act recognized a unique role
for them. In addition, the Judiciary Act of 1922 granted the senior
circuit judge authority to designate district judges to serve in other
districts and circuit judges to sit on district courts. 10 1
The Judicial Code of 1948 formalized the senior judge position
as the "chief judge" of each circuit and vested administrative authority
97. See William H. Taft, Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. 3, 14-15, 17
(1916) (reporting his speech delivered in 1914 at the Cincinnati Law School commencement); see
also PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 30-32 (1973)
(describing Taft's judicial reform work based on an examination of published materials, as well
as relevant correspondence between Taft and the Attorney General, and the internal
Department of Justice memoranda).
98. See William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in
Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 601-02 (1922).
99. See Judiciary Act of 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 837-40 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 331 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)) (providing that the Chief Justice call an annual conference
of "the senior circuit judge of each judicial circuit"); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 227-29 (1928) (describing Taft's judicial reform
efforts, particularly regarding court management, and how he achieved most of his reform goals
only after he became Chief Justice); Walter F. Murphy, Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court
Bureaucracy: A Study in Judicial Administration, 24 J. POL. 453, 453-59, 475-76 (1962)
(analyzing Taft's efforts to create a bureaucratic structure within the judicial branch as a means
to improve Supreme Court-lower court relations); Taft, supra note 98 (encouraging members of
the American Bar Association to support the act).
100. See Judiciary Act of 1922 § 2, 42 Stat. at 838 (requiring the conference to "make a
comprehensive survey of the condition of business in the courts of the United States" and make
any necessary recommendations); see also C.S. Potts, Unification of the Judiciary, A Record of
Progress, 2 TEX. L. REV. 445, 448, 458-63 (1924) (describing the activities of the first two
meetings of the Federal Judicial Council).




in the position.102 The new title was created in "recognition of the
great increase in administrative duties of [senior] judge[s].'
Following the Judicial Council's format, the Act included a system of
selection based on age and experience: "The circuit judge senior in
commission shall be the chief judge of the circuit."'0 4 Shortly after
passage, Third Circuit Judge Albert Maris applauded the creation of
an "administrative head" of each court, which would allow the
individual courts greater control over judicial business. 0 5 Unlike the
former automatic and mandatory nature of the "senior judge" position,
the chief judge position was voluntary. A judge could opt not to be
chief and continue to serve as an active circuit judge.
06
The rules for succession have changed twice since 1948 (see
Table 1). Originally a chief judge could serve as long as the judge
wished. 0 7 In 1958, Congress imposed a mandatory age limit for chiefs
(though not for judges) of seventy after expressions of concern about
judges continuing to govern courts after they had lost the mental
capacity to do so. 10 8 A more dramatic change was instituted in 1982,
altering both the term and selection of chief judges. 10 9 Chief judges
102. See Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, §§ 45, 136, 62 Stat. 869, 871 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C § 45 (2000)). The Code also changed the name of federal intermediate appellate courts
from "circuit courts of appeals" to "courts of appeals." Id. § 43(a), 62 Stat. at 870 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 43(a)).
103. Reviser's Note, H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at A6 (1947).
104. Judicial Code of 1948 § 45, 62 Stat. at 871.
105. Albert B. Maris, New Federal Judicial Code: Enactment by 80th Congress a Notable
Gain, 34 A.B.A. J. 863, 864-66 (1948) (considering the administrative needs in both district and
circuit courts). One district judge believed the 1948 Act merely produced a "changed of
nomenclature of rather minor importance" because the most senior judge became the chief judge.
Clarence G. Galston, An Introduction to the New Federal Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 201, 202 (1948).
Judge Galston is right, up to a point: The statute's only specific command was to change the
name of the position. But, as Maris argues, Congress thereby acknowledged the significant
evolution in the position's authority between 1922 and 1948.
106. Judicial Code of 1948 §§ 45, 136, 62 Stat. at 871, 897.
107. Id. § 136, 62 Stat. at 871 ("If the chief judge desires to be relieved of his duties as chief
judge while retaining his active status as circuit judge, he may so certify to the Chief Justice of
the United States.").
108. Act of Aug. 6, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-593, 72 Stat. 497; see S. REP. No. 85-1780 (1958), as
reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3256, 3257-58, 3260; 1956 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 312.
109. The Senate Report on the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 explained that
under the Evarts Act, "a judge who becomes chief judge ... at age 50 may serve as chief judge for
twenty years, while a judge who becomes chief judge at age 69 will serve for only one year." S.
REP. NO. 97-275, at 25 (1981). Thus, a statutory scheme based "solely on senority, without a
minimum or maximum term" might "require the retention for decades of a chief judge who may
or may not have the interest or ability to be an enthusiastic administrator" and may also lead to
"rapid rotation ... creating instability in the chief administrative office of the court." Id. The
Report notes that both had occurred. Id. The purpose of the revision was to solve the former
problem through a maximum term of office and to solve the latter by starting a chief judge's term
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who have taken office since 1982 serve either for seven years or until
reaching age seventy, whichever occurs first. 110 The 1982 statute also
altered the selection of a successor: when a chief judgeship is vacant,
the position passes to the most senior active judge who is no older
than sixty-four, has served for at least one year, and has not served
previously as chief judge."' While these changes are fairly significant,
they do not reflect the wholesale rejection of a seniority system of
selection.
112
Table 1. Serving as Article III Chief Judge
Requirements at Time of Becoming Chief Judge
Maximum Age at Maximum LengthPeriod Years
Appointment of Service
0 Pre-1948 no chief judges
1 1948-1958* no maximum no limit
2 1958-1982* 69 until age 70
3 1982-presentm* 64 7 years or until age 70,
whichever comes first
* Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, §§ 43, 45, 136, 62 Stat. 869, 870, 871.
** Act of Aug. 6, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-593, 72 Stat. 497.
*** Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 201, 96 Stat. 25, 51.
at least six years before she turns the mandatory retirement age of seventy." Id. at 25-26. In
1975, the Hruska Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System Structure and
Internal Procedures recommended the move to a single seven-year term in order "to minimize
the impact of a chief judge who lacks administrative abilities, while allowing the chief judges
who are good administrators sufficient time to have a beneficent effect on the functioning of their
circuits." Hruska Commission, Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 274 (1975).
110. The mandatory term limit of seven years did not apply to chief judges who took office
prior to the Act's October 1, 1982 effective date. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-164, § 203, 96 Stat. 51, 53 (1982).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000). The statute includes a method of selection when no one
satisfies these requirements. The chief judge will be either the youngest circuit judge over sixty-
four who has served for at least one year or, if no judge meets those criteria, the most senior of
the active judges who has not served previously as chief judge. Id. § 45(a)(2)(A)-(B). An
appointment under these conditions is temporary, lasting until someone fulfills the three core
requirements. Id. § 45(a)(3)(B).
112. The Hruska Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System considered
alternatives such as election by peers or selection by a higher court, but rejected both because
they would "politicize the selection process." Hruska Commission, supra note 109.
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The voluntary departure options have remained unchanged
during the entire period. The statute provides that a chief judge may
step down voluntarily by retiring, taking senior status, or informing
the Chief Justice. 113 A chief judge may exercise the third option for
any reason and continue as an active judge on the court. Resignation
from the court, perhaps to take another position, as when D.C. Circuit
Chief Judge Abner Mikva left to become President Bill Clinton's White
House Counsel, seems more akin to a voluntary departure than an
involuntary one. Impeachment and conviction or death would fall into
the involuntary category.
From 1948 through 2006, 125 circuit judges have led their
circuit as chief. Nearly all have been white males. While a roughly
equal number of Democratic and Republican appointees have served
as chief judge since 1948, the relative number during each period
reflects the political affiliation of the Presidents who controlled
nominations during those years. Table 2 sets forth those and other
salient characteristics of the chief judges. 114
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Chief Judges: Aggregate and by Period
All Periods Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
1948-2006 1948-1958 1958-1982 1982-2006
Age Joined the Federal Bench 46.8 48.6 48.6 44.3
Age Joined the U.S. Court of Appeals 48.8 51.6 50.7 45.9
Age Became Chief Judge 62.8 68.4 62.9 60.4
Age Stepped Down as Chief Judge 68.7 74.6 68.8 65.5*
Female 6.4% 0.0% 2.0% 13.2%
Non-White 4.8% 0.0% 3.9% 7.5%
Appointed by Democratic President 52.8% 47.6% 68.6% 39.6%
N 125 21 51 53
*This figure is based on forty-one chief judges who began and completed their terms during
Period 3 and thus excludes the twelve chief judges currently presiding over their respective
circuits.
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (providing that the chief judge must be in "regular active
service" and thus neither retired nor senior); id. § 45(c) ("If the chief judge desires to be relieved
of his duties as chief judge while retaining his active status as circuit judge, he may so certify to
the Chief Justice of the United States.").
114. Appendix Table 2A, infra p. 51, depicts these variables by circuit.
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B. The Real and Potential Power of Chief Judges
Chief judges may influence legal policy in either of two ways:
(1) through their participation in cases (a means also available to
peers), or (2) through their special formal and informal powers as
chiefs. As to the former, the chief judge holds the same vote as her
colleagues on a panel but may be able to control the agenda within a
case or have greater sway over her colleagues. As to the latter, the
chief judge has a wide range of powers that may affect a court in ways
small and large. A chief judge may, or may not, choose to exercise
those powers to further her personal preferences. But, as we describe
below, the potential exists for chiefs to do so, and some evidence
demonstrates that they have. Even if they do not exercise their special
authority for policy ends, chiefs know their successors might. And they
may, therefore, care about the identity of the next chief.
1. The Chief Judge on a Panel
The chief judge is only one vote on a panel-whether a three-
judge panel or an en banc sitting. But chiefs take precedence over
their colleagues, even those who have served longer. They preside over
oral arguments and the private case conference. If the chief judge is in
the majority, she assigns the majority opinion. 115 These statutorily
granted powers are meaningful. The chief may act as an agenda-
setter, focusing on particular issues, or characterizations of issues,
and excluding others.
1 6
The chief also may use her formal status as head of the court to
gain support for a particular outcome. In close, difficult, or important
cases, a judge may be unsure of her position or may simply change her
mind.11 7 Numerous examples exist of judges switching sides or
allowing revision of their opinions to satisfy the views of others.
118
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(b) ("The chief judge shall have precedence and preside at any session
of the court which he attends."); see also E. Barrett Prettyman, The Duties of a Circuit Chief
Judge, 46 A.B.A. J. 633, 633 (1960) (describing his experience as chief judge of the D.C. Circuit).
116. Based on extensive interviews with circuit judges, J. Woodford Howard concluded that
"[hiaving psychological advantages as presiding officers, [chief judges] are expected to lead
discussions, clarify issues, and speak for the court in the most controversial cases." HOWARD,
supra note 32, at 226.
117. See, e.g., J. Woodford Howard, Jr., On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 43 (1968) (presenting evidence that judicial decisions reflect the end of a process that is
quite fluid, in which judges shift positions and bargain over outcomes).
118. See, e.g., LINDA J. GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 33-34 (2005) (discussing
then-Eighth Circuit Judge Blackmun's communications with his colleagues in which he offered
to eliminate from a death penalty opinion language revealing his personal doubts about the
death penalty if they disapproved of the comments).
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Uncertainty provides opportunity and movement reflects motivation;
both may be linked to internal bargaining. Chief judges appear
particularly well positioned to exercise influence in that setting.
Freshman judges are most likely to be unsure about their positions,
giving rise to the idea of a "freshman effect." And judges have
indicated (and sometimes complained) that chiefs hold particular sway
over their newly appointed brethren. 119
2. Formal Authority
The Federal Judicial Center observed in its official manual for
chief judges that chiefs "do not operate under an explicit grant of
administrative authority." 120 Nevertheless, everyone agrees that final
responsibility for court functions lies with the chief judge. "That
consensus in turn provides chief judges a sizable reservoir of
authority."1 21 The responsibilities may be related closely to cases or
seem wholly unrelated. But all of the chiefs authority affects her
colleagues and thus the court. The chiefs leadership "is best
understood in terms of [her] influence" on her colleagues. The chief
"influences [a colleague] to do x to the extent that [the chief] performs
some activity y as a result of which [the colleague] chooses to do x." 122
The import of a chiefs actions, then, may turn on the ways in which
those actions affect the actions of other judges.
Chief judges oversee and manage a range of activities that may
affect the development of law and policy. For example, chief judges
decide how to divide cases by type, granting certain kinds of cases
greater attention and benefiting certain parties over others.1 23 If an
indigent defendant's court-appointed attorney requests additional pay
or other monetary assistance on appeal, the chief judge decides
whether the case merits it,124 affecting criminal defense in the instant
case, but also the actions of criminal defense attorneys in future cases
in that court. Chiefs also handle judicial conduct and disability
119. See Papers of Justice Harry Blackmun, Library of Congress, Box 12, Folder 13
[hereinafter Blackmun Papers]. Warren Burger, then sitting on the D.C. Circuit, complained to
his friend Harry Blackmun that new judges were too under the sway of the chief, someone with
whom Burger sharply disagreed. Id.
120. CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGES' DESKBOOK, supra note 83, at 6 & n.23.
121. Id. at 6.
122. Danelski, supra note 75, at 506-07 (explaining how the Chief Justice's influence over
associate Justices on the Supreme Court works).
123. For example, a chief may decide to assign certain types of cases for initial review by a
staff attorney. CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGE'S DESKBOOK, supra note 83.
124. Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3), (e)(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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complaints. 125 And, as we saw in Grutter, chiefs circulate petitions for
en banc hearing and may append to those petitions their own views on
the merits of the petitions.
126
Chief judges also exercise power through their participation in
court-related bodies. They serve on or convene national and circuit
judicial organizations. 127 The U.S. Judicial Conference, on which all
chief judges serve, has proposed significant changes in habeas and
other rules of civil procedure. Chief judges may appoint special
internal committees to study issues of concern. For example, Chief
Judge Wald, only the second woman to serve as chief judge, created a
committee to study gender and racial bias on the D.C. Circuit.'
28
A chief judge's most potent tool is selecting decisionmakers for
cases. Chiefs may affect the identity of arbiters in several ways. They
have formal authority with respect to the process of assigning judges
to cases. While that power is often limited by formal or informal rules
regarding selection of active judges for panels, the authority to invite
"visiting" judges (i.e., district and circuit judges from another court) or
to designate district judges to sit with the circuit is largely unfettered.
The circuit chief also selects the judges who sit on special three-judge
district courts, authorized by Congress to hear highly political
disputes like voting rights and civil rights cases.
1 29
125. 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-52 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (providing that all complaints received
regarding a judge's conduct be promptly transmitted to the chief judge and that the chief judge
determine the course of action to take); id. § 372(a)-(c) (requiring that any district or circuit judge
who desires to retire from active service as a result of permanent disability affecting his capacity
to perform his duties must submit to the President a certificate of disability signed by the chief
judge of his circuit). Furthermore, as part of ethics rules, the Regulations of the Judicial
Conference require judges to obtain chief circuit judge approval for any compensated teaching.
Regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States under Title VI of the Ethics Reform
Act of 1989 Concerning Outside Earned Income, Honoraria, and Outside Employment § 5(d)(3)
(Aug. 15, 1990), available at http://www.uscourts.govllibrary/conduct-outsideemployment.html.
126. For an example of such a communication, see Blackmun Papers, supra note 119, at Box
38, Folder 16, Case File 571. Eighth Circuit Chief Judge Vogel included with a motion for en
banc hearing a cover letter to his colleagues subtly encouraging en banc review. One judge in a
subsequent letter to his colleagues questioned the merits of a full court hearing but nevertheless
stated he would defer to "you as Chief judge to handle this as you think best." Id.
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (providing that the Chief Justice shall summon the chief judge of
each circuit to be a member of the U.S. Judicial Conference); id. § 332 (providing that at least
twice a year, the chief judge of each circuit shall call and lead a judicial council of circuit and
district judges within that circuit); id. § 333 (2000) (providing that the chief judge of each circuit
may call and run circuit judicial conferences that include district judges as well as invited
members of the bar); id. § 474(a) (providing that the chief circuit judge and chief district judges
of each circuit shall meet to discuss civil justice expense and delay reduction plans under the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990).
128. Wald, supra note 91, at 1127 n.2.
129. Congress dictates when three-judge district courts, comprised of one circuit and two
district judges, will be used instead of a single district judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (providing that
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Judges, like Sixth Circuit Judge Boggs in Grutter, have accused
their chiefs of using assignment power to affect the outcome in a
specific case or class of cases. The most prominent example involves
Fifth Circuit civil rights cases in the 1960s. During the tense post-
Brown period, the lower courts in the Fifth Circuit were responsible
for carrying out the Supreme Court's desegregation decree in the Deep
South. 130 In 1963, a segregationist circuit judge accused then-Chief
Judge Elbert Tuttle of manipulating panel assignments to ensure that
progressive judges, who were a minority of the circuit, controlled the
outcome in civil rights lawsuits.131 Political scientists Burton Atkins
and William Zavoina assessed the probability that Fifth Circuit panel
assignments from 1961 to 1963 were random as claimed by Tuttle. 132
They found that a grossly disproportionate number of race relations
cases were heard by the four pro-civil rights judges, including Chief
Judge Tuttle.
1 33
a three-judge panel "shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an
action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment" of a congressional or state
voting district). Parties in such disputes appeal directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the
court of appeals. Id. § 1253. After a period of popularity, three-judge district panels are now
required infrequently, but continue to decide timely voting rights and civil rights case. See id. §
2284. The highly anticipated Texas redistricting case, arising from Tom Delay's 2003 efforts to
ensure Republican control of state legislative offices for the foreseeable future, was first heard by
a three-judge district court that included Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham and District
Judges Lee Rosenthal and T. John Ward. Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 758 (E.D.
Tex. 2005). The Supreme Court largely upheld their ruling. League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
130. See generally J. W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES
AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1962) (explaining how, in the years following the Brown II
decision, the local battles over its implementation took place largely in Fifth Circuit courtrooms).
131. See Armstrong v. Bd. of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 352-61 (Cameron, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). Cameron accused Chief Judge Elbert P. Tuttle of "gerrymandering"
circuit panels and three-judge district panels to ensure that they were dominated by "The Four,"
referring to the pro-civil rights judges: Chief Judge Tuttle and Judges Richard T. Rives, John
Minor Wisdom, and John R. Brown. Id. at 353 n.1, 359. Cameron wrote, "The idea that the Chief
Judge may thus gerrymander the United States Judges of a State in order to accomplish a
desired result is, I think, entirely foreign to any just concept of the proper functioning of the
judicial process." Id. at 359.
132. Tuttle only gained the chief position (and case-assignment authority) because Judge
Rives, who became chief judge in 1959, stepped down after less than a year in order to allow
Judge Tuttle to take over circuit leadership. See FRANK T. READ & Lucy S. McGOUGH, LET THEM
BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH 183 (1978) (explaining that Judge
Rives's resignation was timed so that Tuttle would become chief judge, and quoting a statement
by Judge Rives that Tuttle "was an ideal man to be chief judge" and had "much administrative
ability" (internal quotations omitted)); JOHN M. SPIVACK, RACE, CIviL RIGHTS AND THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 126-27 (1990) (describing the
autocratic rule of Hutcheson, who "ran his court with strict discipline").
133. Burton M. Atkins & William Zavoina, Judicial Leadership on the Court of Appeals: A
Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment in Race Relations Cases on the Fifth Circuit, 18 AM. J.
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Manipulation of case assignments, however, is likely rare.
134
Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution nor the statute creating lower federal courts
appears to require the random assignment of judges. 135 However, most
courts have instituted procedures that result in roughly random
assignment of judges to cases. And some courts have promulgated
local rules mandating random assignment with the usual constraints
dictated by the location of oral arguments and availability of judges.
136
Those constraints, of course, may be affected by the chief judge. For
example, court rules do not dictate the means of selecting designated
district or visiting circuit judges to include in the pool of available
judges; they leave it to the chiefs discretion. 137 In addition, the chief
often may adjust the location of oral arguments. 138 In the end, chief
judges who are so inclined can find ways to affect assignments.
POL. SCI. 701, 709 (1974) (finding that the pro-desegregation judges heard civil rights cases "at a
frequency significantly above that which would be expected by chance").
134. Of course, a policy of random assignments does not mean assignments are, in fact,
random or that people will not contend that they are not. Despite the Seventh Circuit's official
policy of random assignments, lawyers have complained that panel assignments are non-
random. The Chicago Council of Lawyers, a "public interest bar association," investigated these
concerns and failed to find systematic evidence to support the accusations. Chicago Council of
Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L.
REV. 673, 705-06 (1994) ("For a long time, many members of the bar have expressed concern that
assignments to panels are not in fact random. All the evidence that the council has seen is to the
contrary, however, and the Council is convinced that the official policy is followed.").
135. See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
random assignment of judges is not constitutionally required); United States v. Edwards, 39 F.
Supp. 2d 692, 707 (M.D. La. 1999) ("It is also well-settled that a defendant does not have the
right to have his case heard by a particular judge. Nor does a defendant have the right to have
his judge selected by a random draw." (footnotes omitted)); United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp.
1201, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.
1975) ("[D]ue process does not accord [the defendant] a right to have a judge assigned to his case
on a random basis.").
136. See, e.g., FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § D
(2006) (providing that "cases are assigned to panels on a random basis provided, however, that a
case may be assigned to a particular panel or to a panel including a particular judge" when
circumstances such as availability of judges or scheduling changes so require); see also Brown &
Lee, supra note 86, at 1041-42 ("[While] all federal circuits purport to rely on the random
assignments of judges to panels ... substantial amounts of discretion erode the randomness of
those systems." (footnotes omitted)).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1466 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[Ulnder both
[28 U.S.C.] § 291(a) and § 46(b), the chief judge retains a great deal of discretion in deciding
when out-of-circuit judges are needed.").
138. For example, the Fourth Circuit, where George clerked during the 1992-93 term, had
developed a practice of holding simultaneous summer sessions in various locations throughout
the five states in this mid-Atlantic circuit. This allowed the court to have contact with various
parts of the circuit and also allowed some judges to sit closer to home. In the 1980s and 1990s,
one such location was Wilmington, North Carolina, where Judge Samuel J. Ervin III had a beach
home. Judges Francis D. Murnaghan, Jr., James M. Sprouse, and J. Dickson Phillips, Jr. sat
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Chief judges must be cautious if they use such highly visible
techniques to affect case outcomes. Disgruntled colleagues, like those
in Grutter and the Fifth Circuit civil rights cases, may blow the
whistle. Former Chief Judge Wald contended that "the line between
administration and substance must be kept scrupulously clear and
clean. The majority of the court must have no reason to suspect that
the Chiefs substantive views of circuit law development in any way
influence the way in which the court is managed."139 While Judge
Wald was arguing that it is inappropriate to use the chief judge's
administrative power to influence outcomes, she acknowledged that it
is possible. Indeed, a chief judge may resign strategically, not to gain a
successor with the same attitude, but to avoid an ideologically opposed
successor who might be willing to use administrative authority to
affect policy.
3. Informal Powers
A chief judge's informal powers are more extensive than her
formal powers, and they allow for the more subtle exercise of
influence. Informal powers include problem solving, developing and
enforcing codes of conduct, and the "dissemination of information
within and about the circuit." 140 As with any organization, control of
these conduits allows a leader to set agendas, encourage certain
actions, discourage other actions, and increase the likelihood that a
court's limited resources are used for issues of greatest concern to the
leader.141
Chief judges also handle small requests that affect daily life for
their colleagues. For example, they control whose turn it is for a new
computer, the renovation and assignment of office space, or the hiring
with Judge Ervin in Wilmington. All four judges were appointed by President Carter. By 1996,
when Ervin's chief judgeship ended, the majority of Fourth Circuit active judges were Republican
appointees. The new chief judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III soon ended the simultaneous sessions
and with it the certainty of one all-liberal panel in July in Wilmington. Cf. Neil A. Lewis, A Court
Becomes a Model of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1999, at Al (discussing the
Fourth Circuit's movement to "become the boldest conservative court in the nation" since
Wilkinson became chief judge).
139. Wald, supra note 91, at 1129.
140. CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGES' DESKBOOK, supra note 83, at 11-27.
141. As J. Woodford Howard, Jr. observed in his careful study of three circuits:
Policy leadership, that is, influence in deciding cases and developing legal doctrine, is
officially divorced from administration .... The trouble is that the attempted divorce
of administration from policy making seldom succeeds in most organizations. Merely
to recite the managerial tasks of chief judges is to cast doubt on the distinction in
Courts of Appeals as well.
HOWARD, supra note 32, at 225-26.
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of personnel. The chief judge prepares the agenda, circulates
information for court council meetings, and presides over those
meetings. The court council, in turn, holds most of the formal
authority to manage the court: selecting staff, approving courtrooms
and chambers, and the like. The chief judge's power with respect to
the council means that she can influence the outcomes in such
instances. For example, the chief judge takes stock of building needs
and raises issues with the council and/or Administrative Office.
The chief is the court's representative to external
organizations, including other courts, legislatures, the bar, law
schools, and the press. 142 A chief judge has special authority when
speaking on issues such as the creation of new judgeships or courts,
the expansion or contraction of federal jurisdiction, and the treatment
of other issues that affect the power and decisions of the federal
judiciary.
143
The chief may also affect the internal dynamics of a court. As
then-Chief Judge E. Barrett Prettyman of the D.C. Circuit explained,
"[Tlhe Chief Judge is by the bare fact of his office in a place of peculiar
obligation in respect to . . . intangible attributes ... [that] come to
characterize" the circuit, such as its cohesiveness, effectiveness, and
collegiality. 144 Intracourt relationships may dictate the willingness of
judges to dissent on panels, to vote for en banc review of colleagues'
decisions, or to defer in other ways to the actions of their peers. 145
Every time a judge speaks out in a dissent, it sends a signal to a
litigant considering an appeal, a Justice deciding on certiorari, and a
trial judge wondering about the strength and meaning of a particular
circuit precedent.
The chief judge position can wield meaningful influence on
policy within a court. Whether a chief uses her power to achieve policy
goals will depend on personality and ability, as well as the position.
142. CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGES' DESKBOOK, supra note 83, at 16-17.
143. Chief judges frequently make speeches and publish articles on such subjects. See, e.g.,
Proctor Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Approach for the Ninth Circuit, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1657 (2000) (critically evaluating two official Ninth Circuit reorganization plans under
consideration by Congress); Lumbard, supra note 48, at 31-41 (offering his views on a range of
initiatives to reduce federal caseloads, including curtailing jurisdiction, creating two-judge
circuit panels and specialized courts of appeal, increasing summary dispositions, imposing
penalties for frivolous appeals, and implementing staff increases).
144. Prettyman, supra note 115.
145. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, An Empirical Analysis of Dissensus on
the United States Courts of Appeals 10, 16-17 (Marquette Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies, Working
Paper No. 06-31, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914409 (remarking on the
assumption that "the chief administrator of a circuit may play an important role in promoting
agreement on the court," but finding little statistical evidence that the length of a chief judge's
tenure is associated with higher rates of agreement).
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But judges and others have believed that at least some chief judges
have used their position to gain influence. As a D.C. Circuit judge,
Warren Burger reportedly "watched enviously as [David L.] Bazelon
used his position as Chief Judge to serve his own philosophy. ' 46
Burger vowed that when he assumed the Chief Justiceship, Bazelon
would be his "model" for serving as chief even though Burger rarely
followed Bazelon's lead on any subject while they served together on
the court of appeals.
147
III. A STRATEGIC DEPARTURE THEORY OF CHIEF JUDGE TENURE
Chief circuit judges are chosen based on tenure and age.
Selection based on seniority is unusual for courts. The leadership of
the U.S. Supreme Court and state high courts is based on either
appointment by the executive or election by one's colleagues.
148
Former D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Patricia Wald has argued that the
seniority selection system avoids the "political coloration" resulting
from appointment battles in the appointment system and internal
politicking in the election one. 149 But does it?
Chief judges can time their departure to ensure a successor
who shares the chiefs ideological views. This strategic departure
hypothesis is consistent with the theory that judges time their
retirements from the bench to coincide with the term of a President of
the same party. But existing studies of judicial tenure are mixed: some
describe a world of strategic retirements while others point to the
significance of non-policy factors such as age and pension. 150 Even
146. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 22
(paperback ed. 2005) ("As spokesman for the Court of Appeals, as its senior judge and chief
administrator, Bazelon was able to assign extra law clerks, and control the office space, supplies
and accouterments that make working conditions a pleasure or an annoyance. His influence with
his colleagues, and especially the new judges, was legendary.").
147. Id.; see also GREENHOUSE, supra note 118, at 24 (describing Bazelon as Burger's
ideological "nemesis").
148. For information on state supreme courts, see National Center for State Courts, State
Court Structure Charts, http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/Ct.Struct/Index.html (last
visited Dec. 27, 2007).
149. See Wald, supra note 91, at 1128 (reasoning that "[p]opular election by one's colleagues,
or even appointment by the President, could add a disruptive element of competitiveness or even
a political coloration to the job" and that therefore "[s]eniority probably does work best").
150. Compare Barrow & Zuk, supra note 66, at 466-67 (concluding that the political
affiliation of the President had a small but statistically significant effect on judicial turnover),
and David C. Nixon & J. David Haskin, Judicial Retirement Strategies: The Judge's Role in
Influencing Party Control of the Appellate Courts, 28 AM. POL. Q. 458, 458 (2000) (arguing that
"[tihe only important strategic political consideration... is whether a judge contemplating
retirement faces an opposing party president and how far off that president's next election is"),
with Yoon, supra note 58, at 177 (concluding that judicial pensions are the primary explanation
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those finding that judges are influenced by the identity of the current
President report a relatively small effect. 151 This may reflect the
uncertainty faced by judges who wish to retire strategically. 152 If the
sitting President does not match the judge's preferences, the judge
delays retirement in hopes that a more appealing President will win
election-a high-risk prospect. Even if the sitting President matches
the judge's preferences, the selection process itself is highly political
and may produce a less-than-satisfactory replacement. Moreover, the
voting behavior of that replacement will be revealed only over time.
A chief judge faces a very different context when deciding
whether to remain chief. The identity of a chief judge's replacement is
(nearly) certain because the line of succession is set by statute.
Furthermore, the chief judge would be very familiar with the voting
behavior of the person who stands next in line. If a judge is uncertain
about her replacement, then the best decision may be to remain in
office. When a chief judge can be reasonably confident about the
consequences of leaving the position early, she should act to protect
her interests. Hence, if the attitudinal theory accurately accounts for
appellate judge behavior, we would be more likely to see evidence of
ideological motivations in decisions regarding chief judge tenure than
those concerning judicial tenure. A strategic theory of departure, built
on attitudinal assumptions, produces a number of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: A chief judge will serve her entire term.
A chief judge will prefer to serve an entire term because it is
the best way to ensure the protection or development of her
preferences. The simplest attitudinal prediction, then, is full tenure.
Of course, other explanations could drive the completion of one's term:
a sense of obligation to the institution, pleasure derived from holding
a position of special authority, or hunger for power. Thus, support for
this hypothesis, standing alone, will not resolve the attitudinal
question.
for judicial vacancies and that political factors appear to be nonsignificant). See also Spriggs &
Wahlbeck, supra note 66, at 578-79 (finding that pensions as well as political environment
influenced judicial turnover).
151. See, e.g., Barrow & Zuk, supra note 66, at 466-67.
152. See Yoon, supra note 67, at 1051 n.77 (positing that Democrat-appointed judges hoping
for a successor of the same political affiliation may have remained longer on the bench in order to
wait for a change in political affiliation in the Republican-dominated White House).
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Hypothesis 2: A chief judge will not step down until close to
the end of her term.
A chief judge will prefer to serve as much of her term as
possible because she is most confident about her policy positions and
willingness to use the office to further those goals. Thus, a rational
judge will defer stepping down until as late as possible to ensure a
replacement that is most likely to protect her interests. Those
interests may include the use of the chief post to affect outcomes or
the protection of the chief post from political uses.
Given some uncertainty about the tenure of colleagues and
presidential and senatorial elections that would affect new judges, a
chief will not consider leaving early for policy reasons until close to the
end of her term. This effect may vary by period. For those who became
chief after 1982 (Period 3), terms never exceed seven years. We would
expect them to be more likely to step down after completing at least
half of the term. 153 For those who became chiefs between 1958 and
1982 (Period 2), their terms can last for as long as thirty-one years (in
the case of one judge who became chief at age thirty-nine). Although a
Period 2 term officially ends at age seventy, Period 2 chiefs may view
the term as ending earlier, depending on when they started. We
expect that Period 2 chiefs will serve a lower percentage of their term
than Period 3 chiefs, but that Period 2 chiefs will serve a higher
absolute number of years.
A term also may end by death. We expect that chief judges will
be more likely to step aside as they grow older because their ability to
control the timing of their departure declines as death becomes more
probable. Aging also may make the additional work of the chief
judgeship more difficult. Thus, older chiefs may be more likely to step
down than younger chiefs for both political and non-political reasons.
Hypothesis 3: A chief judge will be more likely to step down early if
her replacement has the same ideology or policy preferences.
A rational judge will take the course of action likely to increase
the probability that the court will follow her policy preferences. If the
chief does not serve her entire term, she should leave voluntarily only
if the person who will take over her seat holds the same or similar
policy views. We need a measure that will approximate the policy
preferences for each judge. Numerous studies have found that the
153. For judges who are exactly sixty-three or younger, the midpoint is three and a half




party of a judge's appointment President is a good proxy for policy
preferences; in other words, judges appointed by Presidents from the
same party are more likely to agree with one another than are those
appointed by Presidents of different parties.154 Thus, we would expect
a Democratic appointee to depart early from the chief judgeship only if
the successor is a Democratic appointee, and a Republican appointee
to depart early only if the successor is a Republican appointee. 15 5 A
more recent and innovative measure of judicial policy preferences is
the Judicial Common Space ("JCS") score. 156 The JCS score is more
refined than the appointing President's party measure. If a judge is
appointed from a state where one senator (or both senators) is a
member of the President's party, then the judge receives that senator's
vote-based ideology score (or if both senators are of the same party, an
average of their scores). 157 If neither home-state senator is a member
of the President's party, then the judge receives the score for the
President. 158 Because the party measure is better established, we
154. See generally Pinello, supra note 44 (offering an extensive analysis of the use of party
affiliations of judges and party of the appointing President as proxies for judicial ideology, and
confirming that both are dependable measures of it).
155. Because most judges, in contrast to elected policymakers, have not disclosed their policy
preferences publicly, a proxy for attitudes is necessary. Attitudinal studies have demonstrated
that the ideological direction ("liberal" or "conservative") of the party of a judge's appointing
President is a strong predictor of the case votes of Justices on the Supreme Court and judges on
Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., George, supra note 16, at 1678-86 (discussing studies that report
these findings and also demonstrating that the majority of Fourth Circuit judges participating in
en banc cases between 1962 and 1996 voted their sincere policy preferences as measured by the
party of their appointing President).
156. See generally Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd C. Peppers, Measuring
the Preferences of Federal Judges: Alternatives to Party of the Appointing President (June 11,
2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (creating and defining the common space
measure); Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial
Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (refining and expanding the measure). See also
Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on
Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001) (employing judicial
decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals as a window through which to reexamine the
politics of selection to the lower courts).
157. This vote-based ideology score for senators is known as the NOMINATE score and is
widely used in Congressional research. See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY
AND CONGRESS 295-311 (2d rev. ed. 2007) (providing examples of various applications of the
NOMINATE score); see also KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-
ECONOMIc HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 233-51 app.A (1997) (explaining and testing the
NOMINATE measure of the preferences of members of Congress). The NOMINATE data and
related information are available at Keith T. Poole's Voteview website, http://voteview.coml
default.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
158. The ideological preferences in some instances may be subtle within a given party. For
example, on January 24, 2008, Chief Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg announced that he would step
down effective February 10, 2008, before the expiration of his term on July 15, 2008. See Press
Release, supra note 29.
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report the party measure results in the text and the JCS results in the
appendix.
Hypothesis 4: A chief judge will be more likely to step down early if
she is in the circuit's ideological majority than if she is in the minority.
A chief judge has greater potential power when she is a
member of the party in control of the court. Studies of lower courts
have found that judges are more likely to perceive their chief as using
her authority for policy ends when she has the support of a plurality of
colleagues. 159 And systematic studies of the Supreme Court have
revealed that the Chief Justice's ability to use tools like opinion
assignment to achieve ideological goals depends on institutional
support. 160 We thus infer that an incumbent chief judge from the
minority party might be less likely to step down voluntarily if the new
chief is from the majority party. The majority party's power could be
expanded by the additional position of authority. By contrast, a
majority party chief will be less sensitive to the identity of a
replacement because a minority chiefs power is severely limited by
numbers.
Hypothesis 5: A chief judge will be more likely to depart for strategic
reasons if her departure is not due to retirement or senior status.
A chief judge's decision to step down voluntarily will be related
to the reasons for leaving the chief judgeship. That is, a chief judge
who steps down because she is retiring will be influenced by factors
related to retirement, while a chief judge who steps down but returns
Ginsburg's decision means that the next chief judge will be Judge David B. Sentelle, rather
than Judge Karen L. Henderson. Had Ginsburg completed his remaining months as chief judge,
Sentelle would have turned 65 during that time and therefore would have been been ineligible to
become chief judge. Both Ginsburg and Sentelle were appointed by President Ronald Reagan, in
1986 and 1987 respectively, and both have JCS scores of 0.567. Judge Henderson was appointed
by President George H.W. Bush in 1990 and has a JCS score of 0.410. Ginsburg's early departure
is after the end of our data; thus, it is not included in our statistical analyses. Its inclusion,
however, would not have resulted in statistically significant results for the JCS measure in our
multivariate model.
159. See HOWARD, supra note 32, at 228 ("Whether [interviewed] members [of a specific
court] agree on 'strategic premises' has much to do with the influence of chief judges on legal
policy. For example, Simon E. Sobeloff, the able chief judge of the 4th circuit, lacked majority
support for vigorous desegregation which Elbert P. Tuttle enjoyed in the 5th." (citation omitted)).
160. See, e.g., MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 63, at 52-55 ("[J]ustices'
decisions result from the pursuit of their policy preferences within constraints that stem from
the collegial nature of the institution.").
2008]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to active service will not be influenced by those factors.161 Thus, we
expect strategic factors to play a greater role for chiefs who return to
active service than for those who leave.
Hypothesis 6: A chief judge who is a woman or a minority will be less
affected by attitudinal factors than white male chief judges.
We hypothesize that race and gender may play an independent
role in chief judge tenure, but we are unsure of the direction of the
effect. Few women and people of color have served as chief circuit
judges. 162 They must be unusually ambitious and tenacious to achieve
the rare success of a circuit appointment, even more rare given their
race or gender. Thus, we would expect them to hold onto a chief
judgeship as long as possible. But their race or gender may make it
more difficult to serve as chief due to demands unique to their
backgrounds. Accordingly, we expect that gender and race may
moderate attitudinal effects.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We seek to test the foregoing hypotheses against a database we
constructed that includes all chief circuit judges.1 63 Our data is drawn,
in part, from the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") database on every
Article III judge that has served. 64 The FJC database contains certain
biographical and demographic information on each judge. We
supplemented the FJC data with additional variables necessary to our
study.
1 65
161. See Albert H. Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of
Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 509-10, 545 (2005) (reporting a relationship
between pension eligibility and retirement from active status).
162. The 125 chief judges who served from 1948 through 2006 include eight white women,
five African-American men, and one Hispanic man. By comparison, sixty women, thirty African-
Americans, and fifteen Hispanics have served as circuit judges. See the Federal Judicial Center
database, supra note 10, for a biographical directory of all federal judges who have served since
1789.
163. A complete list of all chief circuit judges through 2006 is included as Table 6 in the
Appendix. See infra pp. 56-61.
164. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 10. We do not include Period 1 chief judges in
our multivariate analysis because term limits were not yet in place.
165. For example, the FJC records the first and last year of service, but does not record the
specific date on which service began or ended. Thus, a judge who became chief on January 1,
2006 would have the same starting year as a judge who became chief on December 31, 2006. This
simplification makes it difficult to determine whether a judge completed her full term and to tie
the timing of departure to time-sensitive variables like court composition. To fill this gap and
others, we relied on multiple sources. The Sixth Circuit reports on its exceptional website specific
starting dates for all chief judges in the history of the Sixth Circuit courts. See History of the
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A. The Findings
The first striking finding is that, contrary to Hypothesis 1,
chief judges are unlikely to complete their entire term. From 1948 to
2006, nearly 80% of chief judges voluntarily left the position before the
end of their term. As reflected in Table 3, nearly all returned to active
service (eighty-four out of eighty-eight). 166 Hence, nearly all of the
judges could have departed for strategic-rather than economic or
health-reasons (Hypothesis 5). Women and minorities were less
likely than white men to step down early. More than 90% of women
and 50% of minorities completed their terms as chief judge
(Hypothesis 6).
Focusing on the separate periods reveals that judges who
became chief between 1982 and 2006 were slightly more likely than
earlier chiefs to step down voluntarily. Of those judges who did not
leave voluntarily, all but three completed their terms; two of the
Period 1 chief judges died in office, while one Period 3 chief, Stephen
Breyer, was promoted out of his post.
Table 3. Reasons for Leaving Chief Judgeship*
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Overall
1948-1958 1958-1982 1982-2006 1948-2006
Completed Full Term** 0 15 29.4% 7 17.1% 22 19.5%
Elevated to Supreme 0 0 1 2.4% 1 0.9%
Court**
Died While Chief Judge" 2 9.5% 0 0 2 1.8%
Returned to Active Service 19 90.5% 35 68.6% 30 73.2% 84 74.3%
Resigned from Federal 0 1 2% 3 7.3% 4 3.5%
Bench
Total 21 51 41 113
* A chief judge is assigned to the period in which she began her chief judgeship (as the statute
for that period would dictate her term limit). The twelve active chief judges are not included
here.
** The first three categories are involuntary departures from the chief judge post.
Sixth Circuit, Judges Index, http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/lib hist/jdge-indexA-D.html (last
visited Dec. 28, 2007). A 1970 FJC publication included specific dates for chief circuit judges up
to that date, as do biographies of some individual chief judges. For the hundreds of remaining
judges, we relied upon Janet Hirt of the Vanderbilt Law Library. Ms. Hirt contacted each court
clerk's office directly, requesting the information. We are deeply indebted to Ms. Hirt as well as
the individual federal court staff members who assisted us.
166. We treated a judge as stepping down due to senior status if she took senior status
within one month after stepping down from the chief judge position.
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Given that chief judges leave their posts voluntarily, are they
waiting until late in their terms to depart, as predicted by Hypothesis
2? The answer overall is yes: chief judges completed, on average,
76.9% of their terms. The aggregate number, however, conceals a
change over time. Nearly all of the Period 2 chiefs (forty-six out of
fifty-one) fulfilled at least half of their terms, and the majority (thirty-
eight) served more than 75% of their terms. By contrast, less than
two-thirds of Period 3 chiefs (twenty-six out of forty-one) stayed for at
least half of their terms, and only a minority (sixteen) stayed for at
least 75% of their terms. The disparity between the two periods is
particularly surprising in light of the seven-year term limit imposed in
Period 3. That is, Period 3 judges were limited to a shorter term in
absolute years, on average, than Period 2 judges. Nevertheless, Period
3 chief judges have been less likely to complete most of their terms.
Thus, Hypothesis 2 finds support for judges who became chief during
the 1958-1982 period, but not for judges who became chief within the
last twenty-five years.
Most chief judges step down voluntarily. The strategic
departure model predicts that they leave early because a judge from
the same party will take over as chief. Or, stated differently, they will
not step down early if a judge from the opposing party would replace
them (Hypothesis 3). As reflected in Table 4, more chief judges
departed early when the successor was from the same party than
when the successor was from the opposing party. But the difference is
not statistically significant: the actual numbers are consistent with
the numbers we would expect if party was irrelevant to the chief
judge's departure decision.
Table 4. Departing Chief Judge's and Successor's Party: Voluntary Departures
Same Party Opposing Party Total
Period 1 11 57.9% 8 42.1% 19
Period 2 19 52.8% 17 47.2% 36
Period 3 19 57.6% 14 42.4% 33
ALL 49 55.7% 39 44.3% 88
The chi-square test statistic reveals that, for each period, the party of the departing chiefs
appointing President is independent of the party of the successor's appointing President. For
all periods combined, X2=0. 9 8, df=l, N.S.
The strategic departure model further predicts that a departing
chief judge will be more sensitive to the ideology of her successor when
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the chief is part of the court's minority. Thus, we examined the
circuits separately to evaluate the relationship between the party of
the chief judge's appointing President and that of her colleagues'
appointing Presidents (see Figure 1).167 The solid line in each graph is
the party of the chief judge. The line is at the top of the graph when
the chief judge is a Democratic appointee and at the bottom when the
chief is a Republican appointee. The broken line reflects the
percentage of the circuit that was appointed by a Democrat; the higher
the line, the higher the percentage.
If party control does not affect a chief judge's tenure, we would
expect the party of the chief generally to be in line with the circuit.
The chief, after all, is drawn from the circuit's membership. Thus, a
chief is more likely to be a member of the majority party than the
minority party. Given the role of seniority, we should see a slight lag
in this relationship after party control shifts. Instead, we observed
long periods of minority-party chief judges in the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. And the Third and D.C. Circuits show an
effect even though one party dominated each court for long periods. In
contrast, the First, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to
shift the party of the chief consistently with changes in the
composition of the court. Thus, Hypothesis 4 appears an apt account of
some circuits but not others.
167. We also examined the relationship when using JCS scores and found a similar trend.
Because scores are not available for the entire time, we chose to use party for the purpose of
these figures.
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Figure 1. Comparison of Chief Judge's Ideological
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We also used multivariate models to test for an attitudinal effect by
controlling for other variables that may influence the decision to step
down early, including age, gender, race, and pension qualification. We
examined the departure decision from three unique perspectives: (1) a
survival model that examined the likelihood that a chief judge would
"survive" (i.e., continue in office) each month; (2) a linear regression
model that considered the percentage of the term that was completed;
and (3) a probit model that took as its dependent variable the simple,
binary choice to complete the term or not. 168 In each model, we
measured the tenure decision in a distinct way to increase the
likelihood of discovering an attitudinal explanation for chief judge
tenure if one exists.
We found little support for an attitudinal theory of chief judge
tenure (we report the results for all three models in the Appendix).
169
The two attitudinal explanatory variables are the party of the chief as
compared to the party of her replacement (Hypothesis 3) and the party
of the chief as compared to the party of the circuit majority
(Hypothesis 4).170 Neither variable is statistically significant in the
survival or linear regression models. Stated differently, the probability
that a chief judge will continue as chief in a given month does not
depend on whether the likely successor in that month is from the
same party or whether the circuit majority is from the same party
(survival model). And the attitudinal variables do not impact the
percentage of the term completed by the chief judge (linear model).
Only the probit model produces a statistically significant result: the
probability that a chief judge steps down early increases when the
successor is of the same party. The relative contribution of the
variable, however, is small.171 Given how few chief judges complete a
full term, this is not surprising.
168. For a discussion of survival models (also known as hazard or duration models), see
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford S. Jones, Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in
Political Science, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1414, 1418-21 (1997). See also Zorn & Van Winkle, supra
note 65, at 160 (employing hazard models to identify factors that influence the departure of
Justices from the U.S. Supreme Court). For a discussion of linear regression models, see JOHN
Fox, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS, LINEAR MODELS, AND RELATED METHODS 15-23, 85-94
(1997). For a discussion of probit models, see JOHN H. ALDRICH & FORREST D. NELSON, LINEAR
PROBABILITY, LOGIT, AND PROBIT MODELS 30-83 (1984).
169. Several of the controls-gender, months as chief judge, and pension qualification-were
statistically significant in most of the model estimations.
170. Party is based on the party of the President who appointed the judge to the circuit
court.
171. A chief judge who steps down when the successor is of the same party is 17% less likely
to have completed her term. The probability of completing a term, however, is only 12%.
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Our findings do not mean that chief judges ignore political
concerns when making tenure decisions. That is, the failure to reject
our null hypothesis (i.e., no attitudinal effect) decidedly is not the
same as accepting the null. Nonetheless, a closer look at the data
suggests that there is more to the story than attitudinal theory.
B. Circuit Splits
Circuits vary. Tenure on some circuits appears sensitive to
political variables while tenure on other circuits appears sensitive to
caseload. The lack of a uniform account for chief judge tenure for all
circuits highlights the likely relevance of circuit-specific
characteristics such as geography, docket, and history.
We observed a significant variation across circuits in chief
judge tenure itself. In several circuits, nearly every judge completed
all or almost all of the term. The First Circuit, for example, is the
smallest court in terms of caseload and number of judgeships. And the
First has grown very slowly over the last fifty years. While the
caseload of all circuits increased more than seventeen-fold over that
time, the First Circuit saw only a ten-fold increase. We might expect,
therefore, that the administrative demands on the head of the First
Circuit would be relatively modest compared to those of his colleagues
leading other courts. Indeed, most of the eight men who served as
chief did so for longer than their peers on other circuits.
The two exceptions are Breyer, who left after four years to join the
Supreme Court, and Woodbury, who stepped down in 1964 after five
and a half years. Woodbury's departure may have been precipitated by
workload. The First Circuit saw the largest single-year growth in its
caseload in the year immediately preceding his departure. 172
This cross-circuit variation reveals a challenge to studies of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals: it is not a single institution, but rather a
collection of separate institutions with common dominant features
(such as life tenure and three-judge panel) but salient circuit-specific
characteristics. Some of these characteristics may be compared readily
across circuits (such as ideological composition), and some may not
(such as behavioral norms including civility to colleagues). Moreover,
those that may be compared readily may not operate in the same way
172. The docket increased 30% from 143 to 204 cases for the three active judges on the First
Circuit. This was the largest single-year increase that this Circuit had ever experienced.
Interestingly, the next largest-28% in 1971-was soon followed by Woodbury's successor's
departure from the position. We see a similar phenomenon on the Third Circuit where Judge
William Hastie served as chief for only twenty-five months, departing shortly after the largest
increase in circuit history: 36% in a single year.
2008]
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in every circuit, limiting the ability to control them in a dataset that
includes all circuits.
C. Managerial Judging Effects
What accounts for the increase in early departures from Period
2 to Period 3? As we depicted in Figure 2, the movement is not merely
between the two statutorily significant periods; it exists from decade
to decade. Chief judges are serving fewer and fewer years in office and
also completing a smaller and smaller percentage of their terms.
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While the tenure of chief judges is shrinking, the workload of a
chief judge has expanded dramatically during the last fifty years.
Figure 3 depicts the workload of circuits measured by both the
absolute number of annual filings and by annual filings per judgeship.
The overall caseload and caseload per judgeship has grown
geometrically during this period. The number of judgeships has tripled
over the last thirty years, but it has not kept pace with the number of
appeals.
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While the expansion of the federal bench eases the burden on
individual circuit judges, it actually increases the burden on chief
judges, who manage cases and people. In addition, every circuit is
more frequently calling on senior judges, visiting judges, and
designated district judges to fill out three-judge panels to the extent
that three-quarters of all panels include at least one non-active or non-
circuit judge. And chief judges are responsible for inviting and
overseeing visitors and senior judges.
The chief judgeship has changed from executive chief to
ministerial chief: In the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the number of
circuit judges remained below one hundred and case filings below
20,000. But in the early 1980s, the number of per judge filings had
topped 200 and the number of filings exceeded 30,000. Comparing
Figures 2 and 3, the negative correlation between workload and chief
judge tenure is clear. 173
Workload, then, may limit the ability of the chief judge to
achieve her policy goals while in office. Thus, the attitudinal account
of chief judge tenure, standing alone, is insufficient. Or at least the
account as set forth here is insufficient. Perhaps modern chief judges
who are policy-oriented realize that they are more likely to affect
policy outcomes as regular judges-where they can focus on cases-
than as chiefs-where they are too overwhelmed by the workload to be
attentive to policy goals.
173. The correlation coefficient for average caseload per judge and percent of term completed
is -0.98, and for average caseload per judge and years as chief is -0.833.
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CONCLUSION
Grutter v. Bollinger garnered a great deal of attention because
it involved a politically and socially salient substantive issue:
affirmative action. It also offered insight into a distinct but equally
relevant one: the incentives of federal appellate judges. Political
scientists, legal scholars, and judges have debated the relative role of
the law and politics in the decisions of appellate judges. We think the
issue is more complex. The real world context of those decisions
includes the caseload of the judges and the growth of law. And our
results show that workload, at least for chief judges, matters. Perhaps
the chief judge is uniquely positioned; the chief has the most potential
policymaking power of any judge on a particular court (circuit or
Supreme), but also is most likely to be affected by workload. We can
know only by including workload as a factor in our studies of judicial
politics.
We also found that the federal courts of appeals are not a
monolithic institution, but are instead twelve distinct courts. They do
share numerous features, many of which are relevant to the decisions
of individual judges, but they are heterogeneous. Empirical and
normative studies of circuit courts must take into account their unique
historical, geographic, and legal characteristics.
Twenty-five years ago, Congress set a seven-year term limit out
of concern that chief judges stay too long in the post. Ironically, the
opposite problem has emerged: chiefs are leaving too early. The term
limit itself may bear part of the blame-it may have diluted the honor.
Fixed finite tenure may make any institutional control by the chief
judge weaker. It also increases the number of judges who serve as
chief, meaning the position offers less prestige than it did
previously. 174 We are at risk that judges will not agree to serve as chief
or, if they do serve, they will not stay on long enough to gain the
experience and knowledge that would make them more effective and
efficient managers of the courts. Chief judges wield power. We should
want them to do so wisely.
174. To quote Syndrome from THE INCREDIBLES (Walt Disney Pictures 2004): "Everyone can
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Table 5. Multivariate Models of Chief Judge Tenure
We are trying to explain the decision to depart from the chief
judge position. We hypothesize that the decision is affected by
numerous variables, the value of which depends on the particular
chief judge. Those judge-specific explanatory variables (independent
variables) are gender, race, age, ideology of the chief as compared to
ideology of the replacement, and ideology of the chief as compared to
ideology of the circuit. (We report here the numbers for the appointing
President's party as the measure for ideology, but we also ran JCS
scores as the measure and still did not find a statistically significant
relationship between ideology and departure.)
For each model below, the dependent variable is the chief
judge's tenure. Table 5.1 presents the survival model (also known as a
duration or hazard model), estimated using nonparametric maximum
likelihood ("NPMLE"), in which the dependent variable is whether the
chief judge continued to serve at a particular point in time or if,
instead, the chief stepped down. Table 5.2 presents the linear
regression model, estimated using ordinary least squares ("OLS"), in
which the dependent variable is the percentage of the term completed.
Table 5.3 presents a probit model, estimated using maximum
likelihood ("MLE"), in which the dependent variable is the probability
of departing early. We present results from three versions of each
model: version 1 has neither period nor circuit controls, version 2
controls for period, and version 3 controls for period and for circuit.
A few caveats are necessary. First, each model has a unique
dependent variable. We can't then compare goodness of model fit
across models. Second, only the hazard model considers the changing
values of time-varying dependent variables. For monotonic variables
such as months as chief judge, interpretation of the OLS and MLE
results is fairly straightforward. However, for non-monotonic variables
such as circuit composition and successor identity, neither the linear
regression nor probit models take into account the value of the
variable in prior periods while the chief judge remained in office.
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Table 5.1. Survival Model of Chief Judge Tenure
Female
White





Chief Judge and Circuit Majority
of Same Party
Chief Judge and (Anticipated)
Successor of Same Party
Qualified for Pension



















N=8373. The dependent variable is whether the chief stepped down from leadership in a given
month. The survival model is estimated using probit regression, controlling for correlation
across months for individual chief judges. The coefficients report mean marginal effects, with
interpretation similar to ordinary least squares ("OLS"). The value in parentheses below each
coefficient is the standard error. An asterisk marks estimates that are statistically significant
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Table 5.2. Ordinary Least Squares Model of Chief Judge Tenure
Female
White





Chief Judge and Circuit Majority
of Same Party
Chief Judge and (Anticipated)
Successor of Same Party
Qualified for Pension



























































N=98. The dependent variable is the percentage of the term that the chief served (scale from
0 to 100), and the linear regression model is estimated using OLS. The value in parentheses
below each coefficient is the standard error. An asterisk marks estimates that are
statistically significant at or below the .05 level.
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Table 5.3. Probit Model of Chief Judge Tenure
Female
White





Chief Judge and Circuit Majority
of Same Party
Chief Judge and (Anticipated)
Successor of Same Party
Qualified for Pension
Control for Period Regarding
Chief Judge Service
Control for Circuit
When adding circuit controls, the number of observations drops from 98 to 81. This occurs
because in the 1st, 9th, and 11th Circuits, the chief judges do not vary with respect to the
dependent variable.
The dependent variable is whether the chief completed the full term, using a probit model.
The coefficients report mean marginal effects, with interpretation similar to OLS. The value
in parentheses below each coefficient is the standard error.
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This Article identifies the causes and consequences of a
puzzling asymmetry in constitutional law. Of the three facets of
adjudicative fact-finding-evidence, procedure, and rules of
decision-only two are constitutionalized. Constitutional law
regulates procedural and decisional rules-not whether the evidence
that fact-finders use is adequate. Allocation of the risk of error by
procedures and decisional rules-formulated as burdens of proof-is
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Allocation of the risk of error by
the rules of evidential adequacy, however, is free from that scrutiny.
This constitutional asymmetry is puzzling because all risk-
allocation impacts court decisions and, consequently, whether a
person is deprived erroneously of her liberty or property. This Article
explains this asymmetry in the informal constitutionalization of
evidence-a phenomenon that implicates three dynamics of power
and culture. First, state evidence rules generally align with the
Supreme Court's agenda for risk-allocation. Second, when those
rules do deviate from the Court's agenda to promote local interests,
they do not do so overtly. Finally, a state rule's alignment with a
federal rule of evidence guarantees its constitutionality. This
informal order reflects a series of implicit, but credible
understandings between state courts and the Supreme Court. This
Article identifies and illustrates these understandings.

